Modeling Security and Resource Allocation for Mobile Multi-hop Wireless Neworks Using Game Theory by Njilla, Laurent L. Y.
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School
9-9-2015
Modeling Security and Resource Allocation for
Mobile Multi-hop Wireless Neworks Using Game
Theory
Laurent L. Y. Njilla
Florida International University, lyame001@fiu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical
and Computer Engineering Commons
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Njilla, Laurent L. Y., "Modeling Security and Resource Allocation for Mobile Multi-hop Wireless Neworks Using Game Theory"
(2015). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2284.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2284
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
Miami, Florida 
 
 
 
 
MODELING SECURITY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR MOBILE  
MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS USING GAME THEORY 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 
by 
Laurent Lavoisier Yamen Njilla 
 
 
2015 
 
ii 
To:  Interim Dean Ranu Jung  
 College of Engineering and Computing  
 
This dissertation, written by Laurent Lavoisier Yamen Njilla, and entitled Modeling 
Security and Resource Allocation for Mobile Multi-Hop Wireless Networks Using 
Game Theory, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is 
referred to you for judgment. 
 
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Jean Andrian 
 
_______________________________________ 
Deng Pan 
 
_______________________________________ 
Kang Yen 
 
_______________________________________ 
Charles Alexandre Kamhoua 
 
_______________________________________ 
Niki Pissinou, Major Professor 
 
 
Date of Defense: September 9, 2015 
 
The dissertation of Laurent Lavoisier Yamen Njilla is approved. 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Interim Dean Ranu Jung 
College of Engineering and Computing 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi 
University Graduate School 
 
 
 
 
Florida International University, 2015  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2015 by Laurent Lavoisier Yamen Njilla  
All rights reserved.  
 
 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To the Njillas: 
Isaac Njilla, Emilienne Njilla: 
 Honoré Njilla, Rostand Njilla, Hildegarde Njilla,  
Eugenie Njilla, Herrick Njilla, Dieunedort Njilla, and Emilie C. Y. Njilla. 
 
 
 
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
There are numerous important milestones in our lives. The transition between these 
milestones may be smooth and mild; the end of a milestone is marked by an event. In 
the scientific life, one such event is the completion of a PhD dissertation. This 
document represents the outcome of more than four years of research efforts. 
When glancing back, the outcome of this research has strongly been influenced by 
many people who accompanied me during the whole or part of the work in my 
academic and private life. Therefore, this is also the occasion to thank these people and 
to acknowledge their support. 
I would express my gratitude to my advisor Dr. Niki Pissinou for her direction, 
advice and support throughout my PhD. studies at the Florida International University. 
I am deeply indebted to Dr. Niki Pissinou for showing me the excitement that can be 
found in collaborative academic research and for allowing me to work independently 
too. Her guidance has helped to mold me into a successful researcher and mentor and 
has equipped me with the tools necessary to be successful in the future of my career. I 
hope to be able to live up to her expectations.  
I would also like to thank the members of my Ph.D. supervisory committee: Dr. 
Kang Yen, Dr. Deng Pan, Dr. Jean Andrian and Dr. Charles Kamhoua. Their 
constructive comments have improved the quality of this work. They have been helpful 
during the entire Ph.D. process. I would like to extend my thanks to Dr. Charles 
Kamhoua for his collaboration and all the discussions we had days and nights on game 
theory and the summer internship at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)  
vi 
My frequent exchanges and co-authoring with Dr. Kia Makki have been reflective, all 
my gratitude. My appreciation to Dr. Kevin Kwiat of the Air Force Research 
Laboratory, CyberSecurity Division. Our initial conversation on agility, recovery and 
network security has been insightful. The work on Chapter 7: Cyber Security 
Resource Allocation: A Markov Decision Process Approach was conducted while in 
an intership at the Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, NY site and it is included in 
the dissertation with the permission of Dr. Kevin Kwiat, Principal Computer Engineer. 
 I also thank Dr. Shekhar Bhansali and the excellent faculty members of the 
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department. Their lectures and class projects 
have been influential, and thank you to Ms. Maria Benincasa and Ms. Pat Brammer. 
Because of their constant motivation, I would like to thank my fellow research lab 
mates. Likewise, I appreciate the comments and work of the undergraduate student 
Patricia Echual I have mentored in the NSF/REU program. Thanks to Bob, Darrius, 
Mark, Oscar, Rich, Ricky for the endless discussion we had at the City of Miami 
Beach, IT Department.  
I am thankful to Jackie Genard, Christ’Ella Francis and Emilie for the stimulation 
and support they have provided me during this journey. Furthermore, words are not 
enough to express the love and blessings from my family members. I would like to 
appreciate all the devotion and sacrifice made by Emilie C. Yamen, my little daughter, 
for making this dissertation possible just by loving me. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge that my graduate studies have been partially 
vii 
funded by the Department of Homeland Security (grant# 2008-ST-062-000012), the 
Air Force Office of Scientific Research (grant# FA9550-14-1-0299), the National 
Science Foundation (grant# 1263124) and the McKnight Foundation through the 
McKnight Doctoral Fellowship (MDF). 
  
viii 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
MODELING SECURITY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR MOBILE  
MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS USING GAME THEORY  
by 
Laurent Lavoisier Yamen Njilla 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Niki Pissinou, Major Professor 
This dissertation presents novel approaches to modeling and analyzing security and 
resource allocation in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). The research involves the 
design, implementation and simulation of different models resulting in resource sharing 
and security’s strengthening of the network among mobile devices. Because of the 
mobility, the network topology may change quickly and unpredictably over time. 
Moreover, data-information sent from a source to a designated destination node, which 
is not nearby, has to route its information with the need of intermediary mobile nodes. 
However, not all intermediary nodes in the network are willing to participate in data-
packet transfer of other nodes. The unwillingness to participate in data forwarding is 
because a node is built on limited resources such as energy-power and data. Due to 
their limited resource, nodes may not want to participate in the overall network 
objectives by forwarding data-packets of others in fear of depleting their energy power. 
To enforce cooperation among autonomous nodes, we design, implement and simulate 
new incentive mechanisms that used game theoretic concepts to analyze and model the 
ix 
strategic interactions among rationale nodes with conflicting interests. Since there is no 
central authority and the network is decentralized, to address the concerns of mobility 
of selfish nodes in MANETs, a model of security and trust relationship was designed 
and implemented to improve the impact of investment into trust mechanisms. A series 
of simulations was carried out that showed the strengthening of security in a network 
with selfish and malicious nodes. Our research involves bargaining for resources in a 
highly dynamic ad-hoc network. The design of a new arbitration mechanism for 
MANETs utilizes the Dirichlet distribution for fairness in allocating resources. Then, 
we investigated the problem of collusion nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks with an 
arbitrator. We model the collusion by having a group of nodes disrupting the bargaining 
process by not cooperating with the arbitrator. Finally, we investigated the resource 
allocation for a system between agility and recovery using the concept of Markov 
decision process. Simulation results showed that the proposed solutions may be helpful 
to decision-makers when allocating resources between separated teams. 
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1 
 
The continuing advances in wireless communications and hardware design technology 
have led to the manufacturing of low-cost, low-maintenance and easy to deploy devices 
in order to create an ad-hoc network without relying on pre-existing infrastructure. The 
nurturing dream of building a pervasive and ubiquitous network is becoming highly 
plausible. A pervasive network by definition has the ability to offer spontaneous services 
created on-the-fly by autonomous mobile devices that interact with ad-hoc connections. 
Moreover, the ubiquitous network is the concept that provides available services in a 
network by giving users the ability to access services anytime and irrespective of their 
location. [1] [2]. 
To fulfill this vision of a network, it requires the participation of several devices or nodes, 
from multiple network domains with completely diverse objectives and preferences. With 
the rapid advances in computer and wireless communications, devices and all associated 
techniques and concepts, mobile sensor networks are becoming practical and attracting 
more research attention in recent years. The decentralized nature, minimal configuration 
and quick and easy deployment of wireless ad hoc networks make them suitable for 
emergency situations, such as natural disasters or military conflicts where there is no 
infrastructure or central nodes to depend on. Wireless ad hoc networks have emerged as 
an important information transmission paradigm in both military and commercial 
applications such as intrusion detection, battlefield surveillance, disaster rescue missions, 
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hostile environment monitoring and target tracking. Flexibility, on the other hand, brings 
in many research challenges.  
The mobility of the device is also a challenge due to the ubiquity of the network. By 
nature, wireless ad-hoc network is a highly dynamic self-organizing network with limited 
channels. Servicing mobile users brought a new prospective to an already dynamic 
network, the mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). A MANET is a self-organizing, self-
configuring network of mobile hosts wirelessly interconnected. The mobile hosts or 
mobile nodes (MNs) are free to move randomly and organize themselves arbitrarily. 
Therefore, the network connectivity and topology could be dynamically changed rapidly 
and unpredictably [3]. A MANET can be operated in a stand alone, or connected to other 
networks. Moreover, a MANET can be quickly deployed in any area. Without the support 
of any fixed infrastructure, mobile nodes need to cooperate with each other to maintain 
the link and routing information. Each MN acts not only as a host, but also as a router for 
data forwarding between other MNs. 
Network security and device autonomy, for example, are major issues in order to achieve 
robust and reliable communication in wireless ad hoc networks. The wireless 
communication between typically autonomous devices, where each device makes a 
decision whether and to what extent it wishes to be part of the network's main purpose, 
can become a challenge. In the pursuit of their own objectives, the participating devices 
in the network could therefore exhibit some misbehavior patterns – either by being selfish 
or by being malicious [4]. Because of their limited resources like battery power, low 
radio transmission range, memory spaces and computational power, a selfish node 
attempts to save its resources by not participating in any network task. As a consequence, 
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each node will strive to save its limited supply while competing against needy nodes with 
a depleted supply to gain access to others’ resources with the goal of maximizing their 
own capacity. A malicious node’s main objective is to cause damage to the network. 
They use their available resources to launch various attacks, for example, Denial of 
service (DoS), selective forwarding, Sybil attack and sinkhole attack. The faulty node 
misbehaves in the network because of the default in its circuitry which may be due to a 
physical damage. The internal damage causes the node not to follow the protocol 
recommendations. 
The security is the primary concern of an ad-hoc network deployed infrastructure-less. 
The network needs to guarantee a secure data transmission between different nodes and 
also, the confidentiality, the integrity and the availability of the data should be 
guaranteed. Henceforth, the primary issue that would arise with autonomous nodes in an 
ad hoc network would be packet forwarding. Moreover, here is a scenario, nodes are 
selfish and there is neither infrastructure nor a central authority. When the sender and the 
destination are not in transmission range, packets are sent through a multi-hop 
communication. Intermediary nodes are needed to facilitate packet forwarding. But, there 
is a transmission cost in battery power usage and bandwidth associated with forwarding 
packets and therefore, it is not in the best interest of an intermediate node to deplete its 
own resources to forward others’s packets. Meanwhile, if all nodes behave the same way 
by refusing to forward packets for others, the network will collapse. However, no node is 
interested in a collapsed network as the outcome.  
The network performance degradation can be attributed to node misbehavior. Therefore, 
proficient mechanisms need to be implemented to enforce node cooperation and 
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strengthen network security at all layer levels. In fact, selfish behavior is a thorn in the 
side of networks without central authority. Selfishness and overall network objectives 
may be the cause of misbehaviors in other layers of the network with autonomous nodes. 
For instance, by looking at the different layers of the network, there is a tremendous 
impact that selfish nodes can cause. For example, at the physical layer, a node can 
selfishly decide to ignore the network protocol by increasing its power to transmit its 
packets at a successful rate after detecting failure. The general response of other selfish 
nodes in the vicinity would be to follow the actions generating the successful 
transmission rate. As for the result, the overall network performance will decrease and 
deteriorate tremendously which will cause the collapse of the network. At the link/MAC 
layer, some nodes may attempt to send more packets by ignoring the backoff period. 
While the backoff period occurs for other nodes to use the medium for transmission, so 
instead of waiting for other nodes to finish sending their packets, a selfish node may 
attempt to quickly send its own packets. As a consequence, an increase in packet collision 
would drastically affect the network performance because of selfish nodes. On the 
transport layer, the most widely used protocol in this layer is the User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [5] [6]. The main reasons for TCP 
performance degradation in MANETs are contention between sharing terminals, hidden 
terminal problems, and packet losses in the MAC layer. Furthermore, path disconnections 
arising from mobility and exponential retransmission backoff in the TCP layer also 
exacerbate performance. A selfish node may be unwilling to decrease its window size 
during congestion to take full advantage of its own flow. Therefore, in the case that all 
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nodes follow the same behavior, congestion and contention in the network will be 
worsened.  
Security mechanisms in traditional wired networks rely on trusted systems like certificate 
authority (CA) to manage security operations. In the absence of such authority, nodes are 
required to integrate tools to auto-secure themselves and to rely (trust) on each other to 
secure the network and protect their privacy. Trust, in this circumstance, can be defined 
as the confidence a node in the network has about the appropriate participation of others 
in the security mechanism. Without trust, no rational node will participate in any security 
mechanism that involves the cooperation of numerous nodes to be successful. Therefore, 
several security mechanisms require some level of trust in their design and 
implementation [7]. Let us consider a provider with users to provide network services. 
Securing the network service in order to protect the users’ privacy and personal 
information against cyberattacks or hackers is costly for the service providers. A provider 
would prefer to minimize its investment in upgrading the network infrastructure while 
financially increasing its bottom line with customers using the service or product. On the 
other hand, without regular upgrades to the network infrastructures from the provider, 
there are vulnerabilities generated from the software used or developed by programmers 
and components installed in the network; the upgrade of a vulnerability may open the 
system to other vulnerabilities. With the attackers always launching attacks, it is just a 
matter of time to breach the system due to an undetected or un-patched vulnerability. A 
breached system would have private information and privacy of the users compromised. 
One option available to unsatisfied users is to quit their service provider. Without any 
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doubt, we are faced with a conflict of interest between a service provider and its users. 
The optimum behavior of the provider will be linked to the users’ strategies. 
Game theory is the unifying mathematical framework able to model the conflict of 
interests faced by different players in each circumstance above-mentioned and examine 
the possible solutions with a precise depiction of their properties [1]. Clearly, this is our 
justification of using game theory as the principal method employed in our research. It 
clearly shows that the realization of the ultimate of interconnection between any mobile 
devices, anytime, anywhere (ubiquitous) in life is not possible if the efficient connection 
and security mechanisms were not designed to stimulate nodes’ participation or provide 
sufficient incentives to all network entities. Therefore, a network protocol at all layers 
must take into account the heterogeneity of sub-network components, interfacing 
between different MANETs and components and finally, the self-interest of autonomous 
nodes performing separate optimization. Cooperation among wireless multi-hop ad hoc 
nodes can also protect a network from malicious attacks. The absence of a central 
authority, trusted entity, new and different classes of distributed security mechanisms and 
privacy protections require cooperation among several mobile nodes to protect and secure 
a network from malicious attacks [8]. This dissertation addresses selfish and malicious 
nodes present in MANETs. The interconnection among highly mobile nodes, cooperation 
in resource sharing, and network security is studied and solutions are investigated. 
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The evolvement from traditional wired to wireless networks has brought a shift in the 
primary concerns which need to be addressed for ad hoc wireless networks. Like their 
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wired counterparts, wireless networks are interested in high throughput and low-cost 
design, network priorities will dictate a tradeoff for an increase in power efficiency and 
bandwidth optimization. The mobility of the node increases the primary concerns with 
the connectivity and moving patterns. The more confidently a node shares its resources 
with other nodes belonging to the same network; the more secure is the network and their 
applications. Our research stems from the recognition that mobile autonomous nodes with 
different intent will remain elusive unless a MANET with incentive mechanism is 
developed. The presence of selfish nodes in a mobile heterogeneous ad hoc network 
where autonomous put their own objectives ahead of the overall network objectives must 
be modified due to the fact that network protocols do not have a better control of the node 
mobility and the network operations. This dissertation involves the mechanism design, 
implementation, analysis and simulation evaluation of the resource allocation model and 
security strengthening model of strategic interactions in mobile ad hoc wireless multi-hop 
networks with selfish and malicious users using the game theoretic framework. 
Specifically, our investigative objective of this research is threefold: 
1. Design distributed game theoretic algorithms using only local information to 
enforce nodes cooperation at the network routing layer and optimize network 
performance with autonomous nodes, and imperfect monitoring. 
2. Investigate and propose satisfactory game theoretic solutions to the remarkable 
enhance in bandwidth demand and throughput due to an increase of the number of 
mobile devices. 
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3. Use game theory to analyze new security mechanisms for MANETs with 
autonomous nodes without a trusted authority or a central manager to strengthen 
the overall network. 
Specially, our work focuses on: 
- The study of various techniques for incorporating arbitration monitoring, 
incomplete information into the game model for networks using game theory. 
- Evaluating the performance of models developed using game theory and 
investigating the underlying assumptions of those theories in the context of ad hoc 
networks with mobile nodes and dynamic change in the network topology. 
- Designing a game theoretic algorithm for autonomous networks that achieve 
performance similar to those of cooperative networks with a central authority. 
- Providing and detailing mathematical analysis of ad hoc network security models 
to capture in a general contest the equilibrium conditions in the MANET. 
- Predicting the user and provider behaviors under diverse type of noise conditions. 
- Simulating the designed models with known conventional software and tools that 
will allow any researcher to replicate the results if deem necessary. 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE 
This research has an unprecedented impact in several areas. First, our work on 
cooperation enforcement at the routing layers provides significant insight into the 
problem of distributed decision-making, random mobility, random neighboring 
interactions, self-healing, self-organizing, and the resource proficiency needed to deal 
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with rapid topology changes of the network. Our approach leads to a precise 
characterization of the properties of cooperation in MANETs.  
Second, this research establishes solid frameworks for integrating practical network 
conditions into autonomous mobile network models. Practically, we mean incorporating 
random mobility, real arbitration monitoring, and private information into the model. Our 
research allows the self-interest of individual nodes to be in agreement with the overall 
interest network performance. Furthermore, as with traditional networks, autonomous 
networks need to be secured to authenticate the nodes, avoid exploitation, identify 
abnormality, and protect user’s private data.  
Our research provides novel concepts and fundamental knowledge concerning the 
modeling, mechanism design, analysis, and simulation of complex dynamic systems, 
including distributed autonomous network security. This work evaluates distributed 
security mechanism adequate for mobile ad hoc networks. Evidently, this research 
strengthens the interconnection of mobile autonomous devices in cyberspace for the 
peace of mind of each user.  
1.3 ORGANIZATION AND CONTRIBUTION  
The work in this dissertation is divided into several chapters. We have introduced the 
background, challenges, research objectives and approaches of this dissertation. The 
remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. We review the comprehensive 
literature works related to mobile ad hoc networks and game theory that will provide an 
understanding and significant analysis of the tremendous contribution of the scientific 
world within the domain in chapter 2.  
10 
In chapter 3, we tackle the issue of dynamics of data delivery in MANETs using the 
bargaining game theoretic approach. The mobility of nodes makes it difficult to have a 
better timeframe when two nodes are in transmission range on top of the volatility of the 
wireless communication. The presence of selfish nodes in the path of routing to 
destination renders packet forwarding extremely weak. We model the dynamic packet 
forwarding problem as a modified Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game. In our model, a 
mobile player negotiates with the other mobile node to obtain an agreeable and 
respectable sharing rule of packet forwarding based on its own resource available, such 
that a node should not agree to forward packets without the energy or storage capacity to 
do so. We also consider finite horizon of the bargaining game because of the mobility of 
the nodes and the rupture of communication due to their velocity. The solution obtained 
from bargaining ensures that a mobile device always finds a peer to help forward packets 
in order to keep the network at flow.  
In Chapter 4, the mobility that causes the topology changes provides to selfish nodes the 
ability to move around and not being participative to the overall network objectives. In 
order to incentivize in packet forwarding, an arbitrator is tasked to negotiate with nodes 
in need of data transfer. The arbitrator is considered like a temporary cluster head and the 
nodes in need of service are one hop away from the cluster head. The negotiation game is 
applied with one-way offer by the arbitrator and the players either accept or reject the 
offer. There is no alternating between players, only the arbitrator makes offers. The 
generate offers follows the Dirichlet distribution. 
In chapter 5, security and trust are considered in cyberspace. Three types of entities are 
interacting in the game, the users, the service providers and the attackers. The attackers 
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launch attacks on the service provider’s infrastructure in order to breach the system and 
compromise the users’ privacy and private information. On the other hand, the service 
provider needs to invest in security and protect users’ privacy and personal data and also 
provider’s private information. Users need to feel that their private information are not or 
will not be compromised by an insecure provider infrastructure in order to do business. A 
prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) is implemented and equilibrium strategies are drawn. In 
Chapter 6, the mobility that causes the topology changes provides to selfish nodes the 
ability to move around and not being too participative to the overall network objectives. 
In order to incentivize nodes in packet forwarding, a selected arbitrator is tasked to 
negotiate with nodes in need of data transfer. Because of the collusion of selfish nodes 
may cause the drainage of energy power for any node bargaining against a colluder. The 
arbitrator has the difficult task based on historic data, to avoid node that has the pattern of 
rejecting offers. The negotiation game is also applied with one-way offer by the arbitrator 
and the players either accept or reject the offer. There are no alternating offers between 
players, only the arbitrator makes offers. Chapter 7 deals with resource allocation in 
cyberspace by using the Markov decision process (MDP) approach. The goal is to defend 
a system against cyber-attack using several independent methods. A two-way division is 
agility and recovery. Cyber agility pursues attack avoidance techniques such that cyber-
attacks are rendered as ineffective; whereas cyber recovery seeks to fight-through 
successful attacks. Recovery should be an essential point during implementation because 
the frequency of attacks will degrade the system and a quick and fast recovery is 
necessary. However, there is not yet an optimum mechanism to allocate limited cyber 
security resources into the different layers. 
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Finally, in Chapter 8, we discuss our achievements, the limitations of the current 
outcomes including the simulation constraints, identify future research directions and 
conclude this dissertation. 
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A wireless ad hoc network is a self-organized network formed by peer nodes for common 
purpose without a pre-existing infrastructure as the backbone of such a network. 
Henceforth, data is exchanged between nodes by the sole effort of communicating nodes 
deployed with transmission capabilities. Nodes serve as routers to relay data in case the 
source and the destination are out of transmission range. The nature of no infrastructure 
communication in ad hoc networks requires nodes in the network to cooperate for the 
network to remain operational. However, some nodes may refrain from forwarding data 
packets of other nodes to preserve their limited energy resources. In addition to 
selfishness, other factors can degrade quality of cooperation. These factors include 
mobility and environmental obstructions. In this Chapter, we provide a brief survey of 
related research in the area. We review the research work on encouraging cooperation in 
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). We focus on research that aimed to overcome 
selfishness of autonomous nodes by providing incentives to participants for cooperating. 
We review the different cooperation approaches that have been proposed in the literature 
and focus on game theory as the domain of our contribution in this dissertation. Each 
approach is summarized and we identify their problems and limitations. 
CHAPTER 2: 
RELATED WORK  
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Figure 2.1: A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET). 
 
2.1 MANETS COOPERATION SCHEMES 
Most of the literature review on encouraging, stimulating or enforcing cooperation in 
MANETs can be divided into two main categories: credit-based (a.k.a. price-based or 
virtual currency) [10] [11] [19] and reputation-based [3] [4] [12] [13]. The credit 
exchange in virtual currency systems, the distribution of reputation information and the 
reliability on promiscuous listening among neighboring nodes in reputation-based 
systems raise some issues regarding the scalability of the above approaches. 
2.1.1 Credit-Based Schemes 
In credit-based schemes, nodes use virtual currency to pay for packet forwarding 
services. Intermediate nodes charge for the relay service they are providing as a form of 
incentive for cooperation. The two most popular approaches using the virtual currency 
schemes as incentive are the Nuglet and Sprite. The authors in [10] proposed the Nuglets, 
a virtual currency to stimulate cooperation in self-organized MANETs. Two models are 
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proposed to stimulate cooperation: the packet purse model and the packet trade model. 
For the packet trade model, the destination node pays for the packet-forwarding expenses. 
Moreover, each intermediate node along the path to destination buys and sells packets to 
be forwarded all the way to the destination. When a packet reaches its final destination, 
the destination node buys and owns the packet. Hence, there is an incentive to cooperate 
by intermediate nodes with a return on investment while spending their resources in 
packet forwarding. The limitations and issues of this approach are: the sender may not 
filter the type of message to send out and overloads the network, which may cause 
congestion. To solve the issue, the packet purse approach is modeled. In this model, the 
source node pays to send a packet to a destination node by loading some Nuglets in the 
“packet’s purse”. Each intermediate node along the path acquires some Nuglets from the 
packet before forwarding to the next hop or intermediary node. The packet is dropped 
from the network if there are not enough Nuglets for the service rendered. Tamper 
resistant software and hardware are required for both models to store the correct amount 
of Nuglets. Another issue includes the fact that at the moment of forwarding, a packet an 
intermediary (autonomous) node can decide to charge more, which will cause the packet 
not to have enough Nuglets to reach its destination. 
The authors in [20] proposed Sprite. Sprite relies on a central authority: the Credit 
Clearance Service (CCS). Nodes keep a log (receipt) of all transactions they participate 
in. The logs are submitted to the CCS for clearance and to claim payment. The CCS 
determines the credit of each intermediate node and the cost to the sender. Sprite 
cautiously computes payment to prevent cheating and collusion among nodes. Unlike 
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Nuglets, Sprite does not require tamper proof hardware. However, the CCS as a central 
authority violates the premise of MANETs and may become a target for security threats. 
 
2.1.2 Reputation Based Schemes 
In reputation-based schemes, a node’s decision to cooperate with other nodes with packet 
forwarding impacts its own reputation. This decision is made by maintaining reputation 
information about other nodes in the network by tracking their behavior towards others. 
Reputation information is usually shared in the network using periodically exchanged 
messages. Unlike the credit-based scheme, which provides direct incentives to 
cooperating nodes, reputation-based instead punishes non-cooperating nodes. A non-
cooperative node will have a bad reputation and nodes with good reputation will punish 
them by not forwarding their packets. Reputation information is collected at two levels: 
first-hand and second-hand. In the latter, second-hand reputation schemes [12] [13], 
nodes use direct and indirect observations to compute their reputation information bases. 
For indirect observations, information is conveyed to a node via its neighbors, it’s not 
collected by its own effort. We have promiscuous listening to neighbors' behavior, which 
is used to collect indirect reputation information, like in [3]. However, relying on 
information conveyed by others may not be completely accurate because of multiple 
factors, such as imperfect monitoring or hidden terminal issue. Although second-hand 
schemes incur an overhead in exchange of the reputation information collected, 
misbehavior report can be detected faster than first-hand systems. In first-hand schemes 
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[13], a node relies only on its own observations to evaluate the cooperation of other nodes 
and compute the reputation information.  
Different systems have used the reputation model, in particular, the Beta reputation 
system [12] with a strong statistical background. A watchdog mechanism implemented 
on each node is used to monitor the behavior of its neighbors. After a packet is sent, the 
node equipped with an omnidirectional antenna listens and observes. If the packet has 
been forwarded by its neighbor or not, the result is recorded in a reputation table. 
Depending on the model implemented, models can share reputation information or not by 
applying the second hand information. Nevertheless, second-hand information improves 
the algorithm by accelerating its convergence time. However, second hand information 
overhead creates traffic load on the network. For different models implemented, there are 
also different weights assigned for new and old information. Assigning more weight to 
new information, cooperating nodes may lose their reputation in low network activity. 
Meanwhile, assigning more weight to old information, a malicious node may decide to 
accumulate a good reputation first, then start dropping packets without any punishment. 
Noted also, all packet loss is due to a node misbehavior. Thus, packet losses due to 
congestion in the network or noise in signal received are not taken into consideration. 
Michiardi and Molva in [4] developed CORE (COllaborative REputation). It’s a 
reputation mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks. Three types of reputation mechanism 
are used: we have a subjective reputation from first-hand information, then the indirect 
reputation from second-hand information, and third a functional reputation calculated in 
conjunction with different functions like forwarding and routing. The combination of 
reputation information is an issue in itself; reputation composite does not allow the 
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mechanism to trust a node for one of its specific functions. The assigned weight to each 
function can be problematic. Moreover, to avoid a denial of service, only positive 
reputation information is propagated. However, a coalition of malicious nodes may 
propagate positive reputation of each other and gain longer access in the network. CORE 
is simulated using the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol and shows prominent 
performance results. Marti et al [22] proposed a combination system of a watchdog 
system and a pathrather that selects the best route to avoid malicious nodes. The system 
achieves an acceptable throughput in the presence of misbehaving nodes. However, this 
system does not get rid of misbehaving nodes. Malicious nodes can send their own 
packets in the network, even though they do not forward packets of other nodes. 
Buchegger et al [2] proposed Cooperation Of Nodes-Fairness In Dynamic Ad hoc 
NeTworks (CONFIDANT). CONFIDANT detects and quarantines misbehaving nodes. 
The CONFIDANT protocol is made of four components: the monitoring, the reputation, 
the path manager, and the trust manager. The monitoring is similar to the watchdog 
defined above, the reputation structure rates nodes, the trust manager issues Alarm 
messages on node behavior, and the path manager makes decisions when conflict occurs. 
CONFIDANT propagates only negative information. The authors’ argument is that the 
malicious behavior is not the norm, but an exception. However, the protocol can allow 
misbehaving nodes to mount erroneous accusation attacks and cause the dismissal of 
cooperating nodes from the network.  
The Reputation-based Framework for Sensor Networks (RFSN) is introduced in [13]. 
First and second-hand information are used for reputation. Only the first-hand 
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information is propagated in the network as shared reputation. Moreover, to prevent 
misbehaving nodes to propagate false information (bad-mouthing attacks), only positive 
information is propagated. A combination of first-hand and second-hand information is 
used to obtain a new reputation value, Dempster-Shafer belief theory is used [13]. This 
takes into account the fact that reputation information from the most trusted nodes must 
have more weight. Nodes with low reputation are considered malicious and quarantined 
from the networks. Aging is used to give more weight to fresh information. Thus, 
cooperating nodes can lose their reputation in a network with low activity. 
2.1.3 Other Schemes 
To avoid the disadvantage of both credit-based and reputation-based system, researchers 
have exploited the fact that nodes in the network are autonomous and the device has 
limited resources. By combining both features in a node, there will always be a situation 
of conflict in interests. Some nodes in the network will always want to take advantage of 
the situation which is a rational behavior whenever there is no central authority in a 
group. The use of game theoretic modeling is convenient to analyze cooperation with 
incentives among nodes in the networks. In [1], the authors use game theory to analyze 
cooperation incentives provided by the type of cooperation schemes, and propose a 
hybrid system that offers strong incentives to encourage cooperation while ensuring 
quick and effective detection of selfish nodes. 
Researchers in other work focus on horizontal improvements by enhancing features that 
are shared by most of the schemes in the literature. In [23], the proposed scheme avoids 
the need to maintain traces of past interactions. It permits to avoid tracking available 
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credit and reputation information in credit-based and reputation-based systems, 
respectively. 
The model aims to tag cooperative nodes in the network. Since cooperation between 
nodes will gain higher payoffs than selfish ones, the others will tend to join the 
cooperative group, with the assumption that nodes are rational. Subsequently, cooperative 
nodes will take over the population. In the next sections, we provide an introduction to 
basic concepts in game theory and their application to encourage cooperation in wireless 
networks. We, then, shed more light on bargaining game theory, and review the research 
work in the area of cooperation modeling in MANETs. 
2.2 GAME THEORY 
Game theory (GT) is a branch of applied mathematics that studies strategic interactions 
among rational players who look for best strategies to maximize their personal gain in 
response to others' strategies [1] [29] [30]. GT cannot be utilized to model irrational 
misbehavior of faulty components. Nonetheless, it is an adequate tool to analyze and 
mitigate selfish and malicious behaviors. Studying cooperation in MANETs using game 
theory provides a more comprehensive understanding of the process. In MANETs, the 
players are the nodes. Each node wants to maximize its own utility (payoff). In a game, a 
player decides whether to cooperate or not based on its evaluation of the prospective 
benefits and costs of cooperation and the expected strategies of other players in the 
network. Which means, send the most possible number of packets and forward the least 
number of packets while saving energy and bandwidth. A node's preferences are 
expressed in the form of a utility function that includes all factors that contribute to its 
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satisfaction. The utility function reflects the node's objectives as it selects an action in 
response to the actions selected by other players. The main objective in a network is the 
convergence to a Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium. However, the challenge is that the 
allocations in the Nash equilibrium are not always Pareto efficient [31]. Here are some 
approaches that use game theory. 
2.2.1 Cooperative Models 
In cooperative games, players within the game cooperate to achieve common benefits. 
The most commonly used forms of cooperative games are coalitional games, in which 
nodes form coalitions that share benefits and follow common strategies. These coalitions 
compete with each others as opposed to individuals in non-cooperative games. Since 
coalition members follow agreed-on strategies to obtain shared benefits, there is an 
interest in the value of a coalition as an entity, which is the total amount of utility it can 
obtain as a whole, as compared to the payoff every member obtains by affiliating with a 
coalition [6]. The way the coalition value is divided among coalition members 
distinguishes transferable utility games (TU) from non-transferable utility games (NTU). 
In TU games, there is no restriction on the way utility can be divided among coalitional 
members. The clearest and simplest example of a unit of transfer for utility is money. 
Resource allocation in wireless networks is modeled as transferable utility game in [53], 
and grand coalition is shown to be stable in many cases. On the other hand, the payoff an 
individual player obtains in an NTU game depends on some factors, and among them is 
the coalition structure and formation sequence. In [31], the authors model cooperative 
spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks as a non-transferable coalitional game, and 
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use a simple merge and split algorithm to optimize coalition formation. We provide a 
more detailed discussion of features and solution concepts of coalitional game problems 
in the next section. 
2.2.2 Non-Cooperative Models 
In non-cooperative games, nodes strategically react individually to others' interactions 
based on the assessment of their own benefit. Jade et al. [32] combined credit-based 
and Stochastic Game Theory to formulate an optimal policy to forward packets towards 
route in peer-to-peer mobile networks. A source node requests data from the destination, 
each intermediate node that relays a packet is remunerated with a currency token. Their 
optimal policy is achieved based on cost, free bandwidth, and service capacity. The 
incentive-based routing protocol implemented shows a better performance when 
compared to the DSR protocol. Srinivasan et al. [21] motivated cooperation in a network 
by using Generous Tit For Tat (GTFT). The authors showed that GTFT is a Nash 
equilibrium (NE) of the forwarding game. However, each node must know all nodes in 
the network in order to compute the equilibrium of the game. For a MANET, the notion 
of each node to know all nodes available is a strong requirement for distributed networks.  
Yan et al. [18] [19] proposed models for cooperation in wireless multi-hop networks by 
using the prisoners’ dilemma game (PDG) as the base of their model. The assumption is 
that, any two neighbors have a uniform network traffic demand that is not always the case 
in real network. The authors in [13] used game theory and graph theory to investigate and 
prove the conditions under which, cooperation among nodes can evolve in the network. 
The authors concluded that the probability to have all nodes in the network cooperating is 
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very small. Nevertheless, local subsets of cooperating nodes may exist. The model relies 
on a dependency loop. Even though, each node is only aware of its neighbors as opposed 
to the full network topology. Obviously, dependency loop will not be common 
knowledge among nodes. To reach a Nash equilibrium point in a non-cooperative game 
could be desirable because it guarantees stability among rational players [30]. A non-
cooperative game is said to be in a NE state if no single player can be better off by 
changing its own strategy while other players remain unchanged. However, if at least two 
players colluded, they might be better off by changing their strategies, but this is outside 
the scope of non-cooperative games. In [6], the authors investigated equilibrium 
conditions for packet forwarding strategies in wireless ad hoc networks, but they restrict 
their study to static configurations, i.e., no mobility is applied on the nodes. 
Yu et al [17] proposed a game theoretic approach to a secure cooperation in ad hoc 
network. Comparably, a mechanism design has been used to enforce node cooperation 
and develop optimal and truthful routing mechanism. By definition, a mechanism design 
is a field of game theory that investigates how privately known preference of several 
strategic players can be aggregated toward a desirable outcome. The desirable outcome is 
sometimes the maximization of some utility function or to have strategic players 
truthfully reveal their private information. 
2.3 BARGAINING GAME THEORY 
Cooperative game theory abstracts from the procedures and details of reaching an 
outcome and focuses on the possibility of reaching an agreement. It studies the 
frictionless negotiations among rational players who can make binding agreements with 
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or without the need to enforce by means of punishment on the rule of the game. 
Commitments are fully binding and enforceable. 
The bargaining formal theory was introduced by John Nash in his research papers [33]. 
The final outcome is the main interest and it is often convenient to analyze the domain of 
all outcomes in order to uncover an efficient outcome. The desirable solution is 
expressible in terms of axioms, which ideally should incorporate some fairness and 
efficient features to the solution. A bargaining problem is represented as a pair (S, d) in 
the utility space. The point of disagreement represents the minimum utility level that 
players will obtain if negotiations fail. The set S must include points that dominate the 
disagreement point. However, there is a positive surplus to be divided among the players 
once their minimum requirements are reached. The main question to be asked usually is 
“How the surplus should be divided?”. The strategic bargaining describes what the 
outcome will be and the axiomatic bargaining emphasizes on how negotiations can 
evolve to reach an outcome. 
In [29], strategic bargaining studies the exact specification of the negotiation procedure 
such as the periodicity of each exchange, the duration of communication between the 
players, the discount or threat each time an agreement is not reached. It helps identify the 
behavior of the players. As a strategic bargaining procedure, we have the Rubinstein-
Ståhl’s model of alternating offers [1] [29]. The negotiation is modeled very closely to a 
real-time game. Suppose there are two players bargaining over the division of a surplus 
of 1. In the period 1, Player 1 will make an offer on the division (x, 1-x). Player 2 can 
either reject or accept the offer. If the offer is accepted, the bargaining game ends. If the 
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offer is rejected, then Player 2 will make a proposal on the next period. Therefore, Player 
1 will respond. The negotiation continues until an outcome is reached or the threat or 
discount factor brings the game to an end. 
The axiomatic bargaining [30] assumes some desirable properties about the outcome of 
the negotiation process and then identifies process rules that will guarantee the outcome. 
The bargaining process is ignored completely. The Nash bargaining solution specifies 
four axioms [33], to be should satisfy: 
i. Symmetry: Two players bargaining for a better payoff with symmetric utilities get 
the same payoff. It ensures that the solution yields a fair outcome for any player. 
ii. Pareto Optimality: The solution is on the Pareto boundary. The axiom reflects the 
rationality of the players. Therefore, If players work together during the 
negotiations, they would not accept the disagreement point as the outcome when 
they can do better and reach an agreement. 
iii. Invariance with respect to affine transformation: In case the defined payoff 
functions are rescaled, the obtained solution should be rescaled the same way. For 
example, a change in valuation for the players’ utility implies a change in the 
valuation of the outcome of the game.  
iv. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): Let’s suppose the solution for the 
bargaining problem (S, d) is s*. By considering a new bargaining (S’, d), where 
𝑆𝑆′ ⊆ 𝑆𝑆. Therefore, the solution of the new negotiation problem is also s*. The 
solution obtained is independent of the “alternatives” that are deemed irrelevant 
because they were not chosen in S, so their absence should not alter the outcome. 
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Brahma et al [16] modeled the problem of dynamic spectrum access by a network of N 
nodes as a perfect information infinite horizon bargaining game. Players negotiate among 
themselves to agree upon a sharing rule of the channels. The authors investigated the 
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the bargaining game, each player can maximize 
its own throughput against other players. The impact of the discount factor is also taken 
into consideration. However, the authors do not consider the possibility of players 
bargaining with the intent of malice, a player does not willing to share equitably the 
resource. Hassan et al [34] showed that users can apply a brinkmanship technique to 
present credible threats to their provider by using an ultimatum bargaining game and 
therefore, constraint the provider to allocate more resources to users’s services. 
2.4 NETWORK SECURITY GAME 
The use of game theory to address network security challenges has increased in recent 
years. Generally, the main objective of a rational attacker is to intelligently choose its 
strategy to maximize the damage to the network while the network administrator 
strategies are to minimize the damage to the network. The attacker’s and the defender’s 
objectives are diametrically opposed. Applying the zero-sum game to model network 
security [38], where by definition, the winning of a player generates the loss of its 
opponent. The game reaches the well known Nash equilibrium (NE) when, each player 
applies the best response to its opponent strategy. Neither the attacker nor the network 
administrator can unilaterally make a gainful deviation from the Nash equilibrium.  
In the game presented in [8], strategies and payoffs are assumed to be common 
knowledge to all players. The network security game is known as a game of complete 
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information. Otherwise, the game is an incomplete information which can be formulated 
as a Bayesian game as in [19]. The network security game can also be modeled as a static 
game [30], a repeated game or generally as a stochastic game [8]. A stochastic game is a 
generalization of a repeated game. In a repeated game, the game is played multiple times, 
players play the same stage game in all periods, whereas in a stochastic game, the stage 
game can randomly change from one period to the next. Game theory also provides a 
solid framework to model intrusion detection in a network [41]. A survey of game theory 
as applied to network security is provided in [42].  
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In this chapter, we address the problem of dynamic packet forwarding with a set of 
wireless autonomous ad hoc network nodes, where each node acting in a selfish manner 
tries to use the resource of other nodes. We model the dynamic packet forwarding 
problem as a modified Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game. In our model, a mobile node 
(player) negotiates with the other mobile node to obtain an agreeable and respectable 
sharing rule of packet forwarding based on its own available resource, such that a node 
should not agree to forward packets without the energy or storage capacity to do so. We 
investigate and solve this bargaining process by finding the Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium (SPNE) strategies of the game. We consider finite horizon of the bargaining 
game and examine its SPNE. The solution obtained from bargaining ensures that a 
mobile device always finds a peer to help forward packets in order to keep the network at 
flow. Extensive simulations using OMNET++ simulation frameworks are conducted to 
evaluate how the level of participation of each mobile node may impact the overall 
network performance. Simulation results show that our proposed bargaining game 
scheme performs better than other resource shared algorithms, namely the technique for 
order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) and the bargaining game based 
access network selection for heterogeneous network. 
CHAPTER 3  
DYNAMICS OF DATA DELIVERY IN MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKS: A 
BARGAINING GAME APPROACH 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In mobile wireless heterogeneous networks such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), 
the main focus is on cooperation among mobile nodes. Whereas, mobile nodes are mainly 
constrained by the limits of their energy power, computational and transmission range, 
and also selfish node that may not be willing to fully cooperate with the overall network. 
Specifically, the limited energy and transmission range of a node encourage not to forward 
another node’s data packet given that the packet forwarding task consumes lots of energy. 
Unless, there is an incentive for greedy nodes to be participative in another node’s packet 
forwarding. Therefore, it may be in the node’s best interest to participate in order to 
extend the network lifetime. However, refusal to be part of another node packet 
forwarding will severely hinder overall network reliability and degrade the node’s own 
performance. Hence, it is essential to implement a mechanism that will motivate packet 
forwarding among nodes. 
The novel mechanism proposed in this chapter is a bargaining theoretical game 
between a mobile source node and its intermediary to provide resource in reaching an 
access point (AP). Whenever a mobile node generates packets to be forwarded to the 
nearest AP, the selected intermediary mobile node bargains and the transfer of data-packet 
occurs only if the splitting rule is agreed upon between players. Until the nodes agree upon 
the splitting rule, none of the mobile devices can start data transfer. Thus, this “delay” of 
the bargaining transaction also costs the node in terms of energy. Consideration of this 
cost is conducted by discounting future payoff of the node. The discount factor represents 
the perseverance of the node in waiting for the bargaining result to its favor. 
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The bargaining game is analyzed using backward induction and we investigated the 
SPNE strategies with the player in the game. The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) 
comprises a set of strategies such that, no player in a subgame can deviate from these 
strategies and gain a better payoff. The main contributions of this chapter are as follows: 
• We model the splitting rule which is agreed upon by each player before any data 
communication starts and this is performed without the need of an arbitrator or central 
manager. 
• We model the problem of dynamic data delivery, where mobile nodes need to agree on 
the splitting rule of data packet among themselves using the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining 
game while in movement with the optimism not to lose wireless communication. 
Prior work in the area by researchers are summarized and limitations are also 
introduced. Rasheed et al [43] proposed a 3-tier security framework for authentication 
between mobile sinks and sensor nodes based on a polynomial pool-based key pre-
distribution scheme. Improvements are also made in security performance against a 
stationary access node replication attack. Munir et al. [44] proposed a multi-tier 
architecture for mobile wireless sensor network (WSN) as a key element of the future 
ubiquitous computing paradigm. The mobile WSN is also discussed with integration into 
a pervasive network and an analysis of the impact of mobility on performance related 
issues. Ren et al. [xx] explored the impact of multiple mobile sinks on end-to-end packet 
delay and energy depletion. Tradeoffs are considered to optimize both packet delay and 
energy consumption. Purposely, deploying multiple sinks that are moving randomly, they 
investigated the impact of sink number, speed, sink transmission radius, and data routing 
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on performance. Basagni et al [28] effectively improved the lifetime of a WSN. A 
mathematical model is defined to take into account realistic parameters. 
Niyato et al. [45] proposed an evolutionary game theoretic approach to solve the 
access network selection problem in heterogeneous networks (HetNets). The handoff to 
another network is dynamically handled by the users. The mobility-based method 
presented in [6] can be categorized as mobile-sink and mobile-relay methods, depending 
on the type of the mobile entity. Mobile entities can gather the data from the nodes by 
using sensor short radio transmission range, which is an efficient way of communication 
with respect to energy. 
The authors in[6] evaluated the use of Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to 
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) for ranking candidate access networks in heterogeneous 
networks. Liou et al. [24] proposed a bargaining game based access network selection 
scheme for call requests in HetNet. The bargaining game considered some parameters 
such as the preference of the candidate access network to the call request. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the system models. Section 3.3 
presents the game formulation. Section 3.4 analyzes the bargaining for resource allocation. 
Section 3.5 presents the bargaining with N players. Performance evaluation results are 
presented in section 3.6, while conclusions and future works are drawn in Section 3.7. 
3.2 SYSTEM MODELS 
In this section, we present the system models including the problem description, the 
network model, and the mobility model. 
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3.2.1 Problem Description 
We assume a MANET of N nodes indexed from 1 to N deployed in a wide area. A 
Node is mounted on a vehicle moving in a specific pattern. Each node can be a mobile 
router or a mobile broadcast access point. Since we have an infrastructureless network, 
communication between two distant nodes or an access point becomes a challenge. Nodes 
can be geographically isolated from other nodes, but they are within transmission range 
from one another. The packet-forwarding problem of selfish nodes is problematic. 
Incentive and reward are a motivation for greedy nodes to use their energy to relay the 
data of other nodes. Also, a gain maximization is obtained by always relaying data from 
many nodes and to allocate the limited resources (storage) to a maximum number of 
mobile nodes at the same time.  
3.2.2 Network Model 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the MANET consists of multiple wireless local area networks 
(WLANs) based on IEEE 802.11 standards and multiple access points (APs). A 
Transmission device mounted on a vehicle (bicycle, taxicab, car, police cruiser, fire 
truck, helicopter, etc.) is considered a mobile unit. APs are deployed all over the WLAN 
as a data repository for all data collected. 
3.2.3 Mobility Model 
The movement of mobile devices is seen as random on a 3-dimensional plane. To 
model the mobility, the commonly used random waypoint (RWP) [66] model is similar 
and close to reality. The mobile node moves randomly and freely without restrictions. The 
waypoints are random vectors uniformly distributed in the service area. 
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A mobile node maintains the same speed when moving between two random 
waypoints. In each time intervals the speeds are independently and identically distributed 
(IID). When a mobile device arrives at a waypoint, it may stop or change its velocity but, 
any change of speed is broadcasted to its neighbors. 
3.3  GAME FORMULATION 
We present in this section, the method and constraint used to select the best candidate 
among the neighbors for the bargaining game. The source node which is in need of data 
forwarding service broadcasts its request to all of its neighbors. Before any eventual 
candidate reply to the request, there are prerequisites such as the direction of the 
movement of the mobile device, the speed, and the available storage needed for packet 
forwarding. 
3.3.1 Energy and Signal Strength Constraint 
An intermediary node can volunteer its service only if it has the minimal resource 
requirements to carry out the work. Let us assume the source node s transmits its 
information to the destination node d with power Pd. and a minimum energy spent Es. The 
intermediary node should guarantee at least the threshold needed in term of energy Ei (Es 
≤ Ei) and a power Pi to transmit (Pd ≤ Pi) data with a signal to noise ratio (SNR) held to a 
minimum. 
3.3.2 Communication Traveling Time Constraint 
Consider two mobile devices within a distance d that are in radio transmission range 
TR, (d ≤ TR). 
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Figure 3.1: Example of mobile ad hoc network, nodes are mounted on vehicles. Source 
and access point (AP) need intermediary node to be reachable. 
 
Let Teta denotes the elapsed time of both mobile devices from their first communication 
to them before running out of transmission range. Let u be the vector that represents the 
trajectory of the mobile source device. Let v be the vector of point of origin for the source 
device and directed toward the destination device point represented by the intermediary 
mobile device. The inner product of two vectors denotes by < u, v >. Denote the norm of 
vector u by ||u|| and norm of vector v by ||v||. Let θ be the angle between vectors u and v. 
Following the base of linear algebra,  
||||*||||
,)cos(
vu
vu ><
=θ and )(cos1)sin( 2 θθ −=                                    (3.1) 
Define the handoff point to be the points in which both mobile devices are distant from 
each other of D (D > TR).  
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(a) V1 ≠ V2, θ={0, π}, same 
direction 
(b) θ≠{0, π}, perpendicular 
direction 
 
Figure 3.2: The total travel distance of MDs before being out of range. 
 
During the communication traveling time (Teta), if a mobile device changes its speed, 
the overall time will be an arithmetic summation based on each segment of distance with 
constant and uniform speed, then Fig. 2 shows that Teta, is calculated as  
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Firstly, in traditional direct transmission, the sender transmits its information to the 
destination with power Pd. To achieve the minimal link quality γ, transmitted power has to 
be sufficiently large for the SNR that the destination received satisfies  
γ
σ
≥= dsdd
GP
SNR ,                                                           (3.3) 
where σ is the noise level and Gs,d is the path loss from source to destination, and γ is the 
SNR threshold of the destination.  
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Secondly, we consider the transmission case of a receiver on the move. While a source 
receives information from neighbors, the selection of the best candidate is based on all 
information received such as the location, speed/velocity, direction, and signal strength.  
If the mobile device choice is always based on the mobile node moving to same 
direction and closest speed, then the large dwelling time implies more packets will be 
forwarded through the same mobile node. Thus, the network will experience higher 
throughput and the node will experience less delay in packet forwarding. 
3.4 BARGAINING FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
A cooperative game in which players improve their payoffs through negotiation is also 
known as bargaining game [1]. We model the resource allocation problem as an infinite 
horizon Rubinstein- Ståhl bargaining game [29]. Both players must agree on the splitting 
rule before the data communication starts. In our model, player 1 has data packets to be 
forwarded to the AP. The requester prefers to obtain as much resources as possible in 
order to improve its QoS level; player 2 has the resource storage to forward the data 
packet but prefers to keep as much resource as possible in order to accept more requests 
from other mobile devices in need for data forwarding in the near future. 
 
Periods Offerer (Source Node) Receiver (Mobile node) 
1 K-1 1 
2 K-Kδ+δ Kδ-δ 
3 K-Kδ+Kδ2-δ2 Kδ-Kδ2+δ2 
4 K-Kδ+Kδ2-Kδ3+δ3 Kδ-Kδ2+Kδ3-δ3 
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… … … 
p K-Kδ+Kδ2-Kδ3-…+δp-1  Kδ-Kδ2+Kδ3-…+δp-1 
   
 
Table 3.1: Subgame Perfect Equilibria: Horizontal lines represent the period of each session, then 
the splitting of player 1 and 3rd column is the part of the receiver (player 2). 
 
The bargaining game proceeds in “time-periods” in which one player proposes a 
splitting rule to the other player who can “accept” or “reject” the offer. Let x be the 
amount of resources player 1 could obtain during the request of the bargaining game. Let y 
be the amount of resources available that player 2 could keep or spare by not offering 
them to the requester and available in near future to other requester. Denote K as the total 
amount of resource available to player 2, K-x = y. In periods 0, 2, 4, …, 2k (where p =0, 1, 
2, …) player 1 proposes a splitting rule (x, K-x) to player 2 whom can accept or reject. The 
game ends if an offer is accepted. In periods 2p+1, player 2 makes an offer to player 1. 
We have an infinite horizon game of perfect information. 
3.4.1 Payoffs 
Let consider that if (x, K-x) is accepted by both players at period t, then the payoffs of 
player 1 and 2 are δtx and δt(K-x) respectively. δ ϵ [0, 1] represents the discount factor of 
the players. The discount factor is also a representation of the delay cost for achieving a 
bargaining outcome for the players. There will be no data communication between 
players, unless there is an agreement on the splitting rule. The cost of not reaching an 
agreement is high for both players, because of the mobility of the players. There is a 
possibility for a mobile device to be out of transmission range and start the bargaining all 
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over again with another mobile device. A player values a resource more now than it values 
the same resource in a future period. The decrease in value of the resource represents the 
disappointment of the players for being unable to start forwarding data right away. As the 
δ increases, the players become more anxious because of the volatility of the medium, and 
time delay between two bargaining periods decreases.  
The payoff of player 2 is also based on the ratio of the resources allocated to the 
requester over the resource available to the receiver before the bargaining started, and the 
energy lost during long bargaining sessions. 
3.4.2 Nash Equilibrium 
There are many Nash equilibrium (NE) in this game. Any strategy profile in which 
player 1 splits its data load is a Nash equilibrium. Generally, splits of the overall K loads 
of player 1 between both players correspond to a NE strategy profile. However, not all 
profiles are a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). For example, if player 2 rejects first 
offer of player 1 during period p=0 and offers player 1 a share x > δ(K-1) in the following 
period, then that player should accept, because any share bigger than a previous rejected 
share based on the worthiness of the share at the period. 
3.4.3 Solutions of the Bargaining Games 
Table I shows the SPE of games in different periods [3]. The unique SPE in the last 
period or the period before the device goes out of range is for the player who makes the 
offer. From the table, the SPE shares demanded by the players in an increasingly larger 
period form a pattern. Depending on period p (odd or even), the SPE share demanded by 
player i:   
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 p is even: the SPE split offered by player i is: 
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Also, player i accepts any split equal to or less than: 
]1,0[,
1
)1( 11 ∈−
+
+ −
−
δδ
δ
δδ ppK     (3.5) 
 p is odd: the SPE split demanded by player i is: 
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Also, player i accepts any split equal to or less than: 
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Thus, the unique SPE solution of p periods (odd/even) is “Player i always offers a share 
of (3.4) respectively (3.6) for odd values of p, and he accepts any share greater than to 
(3.5) respectively (3.7) and rejects any smaller split.”  
Let consider the case in which two mobile devices are in range for a longer period of time 
which mean period p tends to infinity. 
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Player i will not reject any split greater than: 
δ
δδ
δ
δδ
+
≈





−+
+
−− −
−
∞→ 1
)(
1
])(1[lim 1
1 KK pp
p
    (3.9) 
3.4.4 Unicity of the SPE Solutions 
According to the bargaining game theory [29], the safety payoff value of a player in a 
game is the guaranteed amount the player can get in the bargaining game. Let m1 and M1 
be player 1’s lowest and highest payoff values in any SPE where player 1 makes an offer. 
Denote n1 and N1 be the lowest and highest payoff values for player 1 game in which 
40 
player 2 makes the offer. 
Player 1 makes an offer to player 2, player 2 will accept x such that his share of K-x 
exceeds δN2, knowing that player 2 cannot expect more than M2 in the continuation game 
following his refusal. Thus, we have,  
m1 ≥ K- δM2      (3.10) 
Player 1will not reject a split of more than δM1.  
M2 ≥ K- δM1      (3.11) 
Player 2 will never offer a share greater than δM1. Thus, player 1’s continued payoff 
when player 2 makes an offer is  
N1 ≥ δM1       (3.12) 
Since player 1 can obtain at least m1 in the continuation game by rejecting player 2’s 
offer, player 1 will reject any x such that x < δm1. Thus, we have n1 ≥ δm1  
From [3], we can say that: 
δ+
==
122
KMm     (3.13) 
And similarly, we also have  
δ
δ
+
==
122
KNn     (3.14) 
Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs between player 1 and player 2 in the 
bargaining game are unique. 
3.5 BARGAINING WITH N PLAYERS 
 With the intermediary device not willing to make available all of its resource to only 
one source device, we will investigate the game with N players. We have N players 
(mobile devices) which need to forward packets to the nearest AP. The intermediary node 
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which carries the data acts like another player to have its share of the resources. Let Pi 
denote the player making an offer and let P-i = {R1, R2, …, RN-1} be the players receiving 
offers. 
To avoid data lost by collision, a token is implemented. Players communicate only when 
they are in possession of the token. A player Pi makes an offer by proposing a splitting 
rule (x1, x2,…, xN-1, xN), where xi is the resource needs by player Pi and xN = K-Σxi, 
i=1..N-1. PN represents the intermediary mobile device. For example, the P1 splitting rule 
is rejected by any P-1 players, then player P2 is next to propose a splitting rule. In case all 
players P-i accept their respective offers, the bargaining ends and the data transfer starts 
[16] [6] 
 
Require: # player, N=2; Time period before out of range, T; Payload, Q; 
time transferring a packet, t; Cost factor, δ; 
Initialization: Commitment level value for player 1 and 2 is c1 and c2 
respectively; 
1: c1 ← value; c2 ← value; 
2: While T > 0 do 
3:   Player 1 proposes z1 and z2 = Q – z1; (z1, z2) with  z1 ≥ c1 
4:   Player 2, accept ← (z2 ≥ c2; True, False) 
5:   If !accept then 
6:     T ← T – t; z1 ← z2δ; z2 ← Q – z1; 
7:     player 2 proposes z2; (z1, z2) with z2 ≤ c2 
8:     player 1, accept ← (Q - z2 ≥ c1; True, False) 
9:     If !accept then T←T–t; goto 4; Else Transfer Q; Break; End if 
10:   Else  Transfer Q; Break; End if 
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11:    4:   z1 ← z2δ; z2 ← Q - z1 
12: End While 
 
Table 3.2: Algorithm for Bargaining 
 
Let define the payoff of the players. For an offer xi to be accepted in period t, the payoff 
of Pi is δtxi , δϵ[0, 1] is known as the discount factor (delay cost in achieving the 
bargaining outcome).  
3.5.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) 
Consider Pi, the player who makes the offer to players P-i. The token is distributed 
following the round robin between all players. The SPE of the bargaining game; Pi 
demands of a split 
∑ =
N
j
j
K
1
δ
      (15) 
The receivers of the offers P-i to share,  
∑ =
N
j
j
pK
1
δ
δ       (16) 
Equations (15) and (16) show that the SPE shares of a player is K/N as δ tends to 1. 
Since we are in a volatile environment with nodes moving randomly, there are chances for 
nodes to be out of range. There is no patience for all players; there is no need to be 
comfortable rejecting offers with hope for better. It may end up being a waste of precious 
energy. It is insightful to think that player PN (carrier) gets a lesser fraction of the 
resource. In our game, all players are anxious to find themselves out of range, combine 
with the waste of energy. Therefore, players will aim for an equal distribution of the 
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resources.  
3.5.2 Resource Allocation Algorithm  
The minimal acceptable share for a player is the only private information. Sharing 
information that may cause others to not offer anything better during the bargaining 
session. The algorithm in table II shows the resource allocation procedure players 1 and 2 
will invoke when making an offer during bargaining. 
3.6 SIMULATION RESULTS 
We developed an OMNET++ [46] based simulation model for our proposed scheme. 
The OMNET++ is a discrete-event network simulation framework. The goal of this 
framework project is to develop a preferred and an open simulation environment for 
networking research. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the simulation environment is a grid where 
mobile nodes move following the north, south, east and west direction. The system 
parameters for this MANET are provided in table 3.3. The mobile device’s speed is a 
random variable which is uniformly distributed. The device mobility is randomly and 
independently set from each other. The slot duration is set to be larger than packet 
duration in order to keep the nodes in the network time-synchronized. These guard bands 
are needed to compensate the arbitrary delays incurred by transmitted packets due to 
signal propagation delays or clock drifts. 
The proposed bargaining game scheme in this chapter is compared quantitatively with 
the scheme of bargaining game based access network selection (BGANS) [24], and also 
with the TOPSIS scheme [16] [26]. With the TOPSIS scheme, only mobile devices with 
speeds lower than 2 m/s will see LANs as candidate access networks. In the BGANS 
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approach, if the dwelling factors are larger, without taking into account the residual 
energy; then there is a high possibility of handoff because of lower energy for 
transmission. 
 
Figure 3.3. Handoff Occurrence Ratio 
 
Figure 3.3 represents the handoff occurrence ratio. By definition, the handoff occurrence 
ratio is the average number of handoffs that a mobile device tried each time to connect. 
The proposed scheme has a better handoffs ratio compared to the TOPSIS and BGANS. 
The improvement is about 60% lower than the BGANS and the BGANS is about 40% 
lower than TOPSIS for an arrival rate of 0.1. The ratio improvement is due to that the 
bargaining game takes into consideration the devices’ mobility, the time to remain 
connected and mainly the availability of the resource to be allocated. The receiver of a 
mobile device tends to allocate a portion of its resources based on section VI. A portion 
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of a requested resource is always better than no resource at all. Meanwhile, the BGANS 
tends to allocate more resource to requests with larger dwelling factors. 
 
Figure 3.4: Handoff Request Blocking Ratio 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the handoff request blocking probability, defined as the probability that a 
mobile device request for data communication fails to handoff to the intended mobile 
node. The performance improvement for handoff request blocking is lower compared the 
TOPSIS and BGANS schemes for about 25% for the BGANS scheme. Our proposed 
scheme uses the fact that a mobile device is not isolated or clustered. A receiver mobile 
device of the request has resources to allocate reason of the bargaining. Multiple requests 
from different mobile nodes may cause channel interference and block a request to the 
destination. The handoff request blocking ratio increases when the arrival rate goes over 
the value of “1”. Hence, the mobility and the bargaining game scheme lower the handoff 
blocking probability.  
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
Arrival Request Rate
H
an
do
ff 
R
eq
ue
st
 B
lo
ck
in
g 
R
at
io
 
 
TOPSIS
BGANS
The Proposed Scheme
46 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: New Request Blocking Ratio 
 
The above figure 3.5 shows the new request blocking ratio/probability versus the arrival 
request rate for mobile nodes connectivity. The proposed scheme shows an increase of the 
new request blocking probability when the arrival rate is about 1.1, and this improvement 
is based on the availability of a shared bargaining resource to be allocated. The nodes 
solicited for data communication are not the same which reduces the probability of new 
blocking request. The TOPSIS and the BGANS new request blocking probability tend to 
the same result with different arrival request rate.  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, a bargaining-game algorithm has been proposed for the resource allocation 
of mobile nodes in wireless mobile ad hoc networks. The algorithm is based on the 
Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game model with the objective of maximizing the resources 
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to be allocated to a mobile device in need. The bargaining game algorithm takes into 
consideration multiple factors such as the general connection duration among mobile 
devices, the mobility pattern, and the payload to transfer. Based on the experimental 
results from the OMNET++ simulation framework, we found that the scheme proposed 
may perform better than the TOPSIS and BGANS schemes in terms of the handoff 
occurrence and request dropping probability per connection. 
For future work, we plan to investigate this model further with a continuous-time which is 
a more realistic model. We will explore the possibility of combining the bargaining game 
with another game theoretic model to refine the payoffs of players. 
  
48 
 
One of the major design issues in dynamic networks is the availability of resources 
when in need. Because of the volatility of wireless connections in mobile ad-hoc 
networks (MANETs), resource seems scarce when mobile devices need to forward 
information on a dynamic network. A connection through a mobile node may not be 
available because of the greediness of a selfish node. In this chapter, we address the issue 
of dynamic packet forwarding by a set of wireless autonomous ad hoc network nodes. 
Wireless nodes acting in a selfish manner try to use the resource of other nodes without 
being participative. We model the dynamic packet forwarding problem as a negotiation 
model game with an arbitrator. In our model, a group of mobile nodes (players) negotiate 
with a mobile arbitrator to obtain an agreeable resource allocation based on a simple 
majority rule to forward packets. The mobile arbitrator submits offers to each mobile 
device in the group, whereas mobile nodes decide to agree or disagree on the offer. The 
ultimate decision is made by simple majority. We investigate and solve the negotiation by 
finding the optimal Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies of the game. We consider a 
Dirichlet distribution offers on a finite volatile and a sporadic time limitation set of 
mobile devices for the negotiation game. The solution obtained from negotiation ensures 
that a mobile device always finds a peer or arbitrator to help forwarding packets in order 
to keep the network flowing. Mathematical proofs and MATLAB simulations support our 
model. 
CHAPTER 4  
GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN DYNAMIC 
MULTI-HOPS NETWORKS WITH ARBITRATION 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been tremendous active research in deploying and supporting 
terminal mobility in dynamic networks. One of the design issues is the resource allocation 
and availability in ephemeral networks such as MANETs [49]. A MANET is a group of 
autonomous mobile devices deployed without fixed infrastructures. In such a network 
with a sporadic connectivity, the device mobility can be exploited for data dissemination, 
and low link reliability is allowed for delay-tolerant applications. Although nodes may be 
static or mobile, they rely on other nodes for data transfer. Furthermore, an autonomous 
behavior and resource limitations such as in energy power may cause a node to be selfish. 
Cooperation or participation to keep the network flowing is crucial among nodes in the 
community or group [1]. Unless there is an incentive for greedy nodes to participate in 
another node’s data transfer, it may not be in the node’s best interest to deplete its own 
energy power. However, refusal to be part of packet forwarding will severely hinder 
network reliability and degrade the node’s own performance. Thus, it is essential to 
implement a mechanism that will motivate data transfer among nodes. 
From the existing literature, researchers have proposed ways to stimulate a node’s 
participation to strengthen network vitality. Many have discussed reward programs and 
incentive mechanisms to ensure that a selfish behavior is not inhibiting [82].  However, 
the need for an optimal solution is apparent in a volatile network which is a characteristic 
of MANETs.  The novel mechanism proposed in this chapter enforces a game-theoretic 
model of communication among nodes.  The model introduces a bargaining game with 
arbitration between mobile source nodes (players) and the intermediary mobile node (the 
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arbitrator). The arbitrator en route to the nearest access point (AP) invokes the negotiation 
game with players whenever requests to forward packets are made. The arbitrator submits 
a share of its resource availability to each player, and the players decide to agree or 
disagree on their offers. The shared value is a random number generated from Dirichlet’s 
distribution, which provides equitable outcomes for players. We investigate the NE 
strategies and how optimal solutions are derived to allocate the shared resource to players. 
The ultimate decision is based on a simple majority of players agreeing on their offers 
[31]. If a simple majority is reached, mobile devices may transfer data. Otherwise, new 
offers may be submitted again, and the cost of not reaching the majority vote is discounted 
from the overall resource by a factor δ (δ < 1). Discounting successive payoffs represent 
the perseverance of the players waiting for a better offer. If simple majority is not 
ascertained by the final cycle, and at least one player is out of transmission range to end 
the game. 
The mobility and wider transmission range of the arbitrator make it ideal for data 
transmission. Its mobility covers broader locations, while its wide transmission range 
reduces the number of hops between a source node and its destination. As a result, the 
arbitrator’s routing table is also up-to-date with the latest routes to destinations. 
Furthermore, introducing the bargaining game with arbitration ensures there is an 
incentive for nodes to cooperate in packet forwarding and expedite network reliability. 
Some early research works exist in this area, and we summarize them here. In [50], 
Buttyan and Hubaux introduced virtual currency as an incentive for nodes to cooperate 
with each other. Intermediate nodes, for example, charge the source a ‘nuglet’ to transfer 
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packet. Through the estimated route, the source allocates a set amount of ‘nuglets’ for a 
packet to be delivered at destination. When an intermediate node routes packet to the next 
node, it decrements the ‘nuglet’ count by one. This approach does not consider the 
possibility of nodes charging more than a unit of currency, as well as packets dropping 
when there are no more tokens available for payment. 
Liou et al. [24] proposed a bargaining game based on a network selection access 
scheme for call requests in heterogeneous networks. The bargaining game considers some 
parameters, including a candidate’s preferred method of network access, such as wireless 
metropolitan area networks, 3G/CDMA networks, and wireless local area networks, and 
the mobility pattern of the mobile device. This approach requires the network 
infrastructure to be static. The base stations are static while only the mobile devices are 
moving. 
Marti et al. [22] studied techniques for improving the throughput in MANET in the 
presence of nodes that agree to forward packets but fail to deliver them. The authors 
categorize nodes as watchdog nodes that identify misbehaving nodes and pathrater 
nodes, which help routing protocols to avoid these nodes. The watchdog feature has the 
ability to detect misbehaving nodes in a static neighborhood. However, it might not be 
able to detect a compromised node in the presence of ambiguous collusion and false 
behavior. 
Niyato et al. [45] introduced an evolutionary game theoretic approach in resolving the 
issue of network access selection in heterogeneous networks. The handoff to another 
network is dynamically handled by the users. The mobility-based method presented in [6] 
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can be categorized as mobile-sink and mobile-relay methods, depending on the type of 
the mobile entity. Mobile entities can gather data from the nodes by using their short 
radio transmission range, which is an efficient way of communication with respect to 
energy.  
Riordan and Grigoras [52] proposed a data mule service for mobile ad-hoc networks. 
The work is based on a service-driven MANET. The client is a requester of a service, and 
the provider of the service may no longer be on the same network due to mobility. The 
mule is highly mobile, and it joins a large network to have the best chance of delivering 
results to the requester. This approach involves the storage of multiple network 
memberships and requires the mule to be the data transporter itself, which is good for 
delay tolerant applications. 
In this chapter, we are interested in resource allocation and optimization in 
heterogeneous MANETs with devices in full mobility. This is obtained through the 
proposition of bargaining games with an arbitrator applying the Dirichlet distribution. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the system 
models and motivations. In Section 4.3, we propose the game theoretic analysis. Section 
4.4 presents the negotiation with n players. Section 4.5 presents the simulation results 
while conclusions and future works are drawn in Section 4.6. 
4.2 SYSTEM MODELS AND MOTIVATIONS 
In this section, we first present our system models under the problem description, our 
motivations towards this work and the network model. 
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4.2.1. Problem Description 
We consider a scenario in MANET with N nodes indexed from 1 to N deployed in an 
area. Nodes are fixed or mounted on a vehicle moving through various routes. Each node 
can be a mobile router or a mobile broadcast access point. Each node also has the ability to 
store, process and relay packets to other nodes if there is a need to do so. Due to the 
limited resource of a node, relaying packets is not always in the node’s best interest, but 
it’s in the best interest of the overall health of the network. Since we have a system 
without a fixed infrastructure, communication between two distant nodes or an access 
point becomes a challenge. Nodes can be geographically isolated from other nodes, and in 
order to remain in communication with others, a negotiation with intermediary nodes is 
necessary to have their packets relayed. The packet-forwarding dilemma of selfish nodes 
is an issue. Incentives and rewards are motivations for greedy nodes to use their energy to 
relay data of other nodes. 
4.2.2 Motivations 
Mobile devices in MANETs are selfish due to the limited resources available to them. 
Due to the greediness of these nodes, it might be difficult for distant nodes to 
communicate. In order for a source node to communicate with a distant destination node, 
the source needs to run the routing algorithm and find the shortest path (multi-hop 
network). It must then negotiate incentives and rewards with nodes along the path to 
forward packets. Providing arbitrators as data carriers (mules) [52] and mobile devices 
with wider transmission is beneficial in a multi-hop network because they can reduce the 
number of hops as a result of their extended radio ranges. An arbitrator’s mobility can also 
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provide the latest location that a node previously encountered in its pathway through a 
routing table. Therefore, when an arbitrator offers to be the data carrier for a source node, 
there is a better chance of having fewer hops to reach the destination. 
The arbitrator’s role in the MANET introduces some implementation constraints which 
needs to be considered. First, multiple nodes can solicit the same arbitrator at the same 
time. To avoid collision packets due to the hidden node problem on the arbitrator’s 
channel [53], the mobile nodes do not have to transmit at the same time. The hidden 
terminal problem occurs when a node is in transmission range of a wireless access point 
(AP), but not from the transmission range of other nodes communicating with the 
determined AP. This leads to difficulties in media access control. To solve the problem, 
the arbitrator implements a round robin algorithm [6] [53] coupled with the handshaking 
procedure of the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA). 
Apart from accommodating selfish nodes in the MANET, the arbitrator may also have to 
deal with malicious nodes. These malicious nodes may collude with each other to drain an 
arbitrator’s resource. Malicious nodes can extend the duration of the bargaining, which is 
achieved by generating multiple bargain requests [54]. Meanwhile, normal nodes wait to 
strike a bargain deal with the arbitrator before going out of radio range. Therefore, the 
main objective of the malicious nodes is to waste energy resources of the arbitrator and 
cause delays. The proposed solution to such collusion is for the arbitrator to limit the 
number of bargaining requests and time spent with each node. 
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4.2.3 Network Model 
The MANET consists of wireless local area networks (WLANs) based on IEEE 802.11 
standards and multiple access point (APs). Transmission devices mounted on vehicles 
(light poles, bicycles, taxi cabs, cars, police cruisers, fire trucks, helicopters, etc.) are 
considered mobile units. APs are deployed all over the WLAN as data repositories for all 
collected data. 
The movement of mobile devices is seen as random on a 3-dimensional plane. The 
mobile node moves randomly and freely without restrictions, but the mobility coverage 
area of two different types of vehicles may be different. For example, a city police cruiser 
may cover city limits while a sheriff’s cruiser may cover both city and county limits. The 
waypoints are random vectors uniformly distributed in the service area. A mobile node 
keeps its neighbors informed by broadcasting any change that occurs, such as changes in 
speed, direction, location, etc. During each time interval, the speeds are independently and 
identically distributed (IID). When a mobile device arrives at a waypoint, it can stop or 
change its parameters. We also present the method and constraint used to recognize the 
arbitrator among the neighbors for the negotiation game. Nodes in need of data forwarding 
services broadcast their request to all of their neighbors. The eventual arbitrator broadcasts 
its availability to collect data from neighboring nodes. The arbitrator in the vicinity replies 
to the group request only if it has the energy power and resource available to deliver data 
to the destination. 
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4.3 PROPOSED GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
In this section, we provide an analysis of strategic interactions with the arbitrator and the 
general equilibrium property of the negotiation game that uses simple majority rule with 
finite horizon of negotiations. A node may be a radar unit, a wireless application, or sensor 
involved in any monitoring activity or data supplying activity. We may have multiple 
nodes to monitor the same environment or event. Given the limited mobility and 
selfishness of nodes, a single node cannot sense and deliver data on its own [49]. Rather, a 
node with high mobility is used as a mule (the arbitrator) for data transfer. An arbitrator in 
an area collects data to be transferred to the AP and also governs the resource to be 
allocated to each node. The shared resource is randomly assigned. Nodes receive their 
offers and decide to either accept or reject them. A simple majority vote carries out the 
ultimate decision. It is necessary to calculate the number p of negotiators yielding to their 
offers, such that p ≥ int(n/2)+1, where n is the number of negotiators, and int represents 
the integer division function. If the condition holds true, the majority of offers is accepted. 
Otherwise, it is rejected, the players proceed to the next round, and the resource is 
discounted by δ<1.  
4.3.1 Negotiation Model 
The players are the nodes. The set of players is N = {1,2,…, n}. An arbitrator is 
introduced as an independent participant that owns the data-carrier unit to be shared 
among players. The arbitrator submits offers to players and computes the decision. Players 
provide location coordinates, speed, and direction of their movement. Let’s assume that 
the arbitrator represents a random generator. Consider k, a given time interval that 
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negotiations run on. At each shot, the arbitrator makes random offers. Also consider K the 
number of interval cycles before the game is over due to node(s) being out of range. If 
negotiations result in no decision between players, the game ends. 
Based on the current location each player yields, the arbitrator estimates the residual 
travel time before the group is dismantled. In order not to lose the negotiation session 
completely, the arbitrator offers an equal allocation on the last time interval. Each player 
can estimate its residual travel time with the arbitrator. The arbitrator applies the random 
generator described in the following subsection. 
4.3.2 Dirichlet Distribution 
The Dirichlet distribution by definition, captures a sequence of observations of the n 
possible outcomes with n positive real parameters xi, i=1,…,n, each corresponding to one 
of the possible outcomes. The probability density function (pmf) of the Dirichlet 
distribution (Dir) for variable vector xi = (x1, x2,…, xn) with parameter vector (k1, …, kn) 
is given as  
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depends on a set of parameters (k1, …, kn). They serve for adjusting the weights of the 
distribution and if k is not a constant vector, the density is not symmetric [31]. The 
operation Γ represents the Gamma function.  
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4.3.3 Negotiation Game with Three Players 
For simplicity, we start by presenting a three player negotiation game with an arbitrator. 
The n players’ case study will be the subject of section V. In this section, we assume that 
at least two players agree on their offers, the game ends. We also assume that the arbitrator 
is the data-carrier. The arbitrator possesses a data storage unit available for packet 
forwarding. For example, a 500 Megabytes of memory space available will be shared 
among players if they agree on the offers. A share is presented as a fraction of a unit. 
Let us examine the case of three players, and consider that the negotiations cover the 
horizon of K shots. Thereafter, the game ends by count down if after K shots, there is no 
agreement and any one player is out of transmission range. Let us suppose that k shots 
remain. The arbitrator makes offers to players in a form vector (x1k, x2k, x3k). During each 
cycle, offers represent random variables distributed according to the Dirichlet law. The 
joint density function has the form, 
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where x1+x2+x3 = 1 and k1=k2=k3 = 1, so that all players have the same weight. 
For any given offer vector (x1, x2, x3), each of the three players has two alternatives:  
(i) accepts the current offer or  
(ii) rejects the current offer with the hope of a better offer at the next period.  
The delay caused by the non-agreement during each shot is discounted by δ (where δ ≤ 
1). The lost in energy for each player in terms of communication while rejecting an offer 
should be worth the wait. At the last shot k = 0 with all previous negotiations failed, all 
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three players always receive the ultimate offers. The ultimate offer is the vector (⅓, ⅓, ⅓) 
in terms of storage allocation. Since the arbitrator follows majority rule, we must analyze 
the scenario of two out of three players’ agreements to offers from the arbitrator. 
4.3.4 Optimal Strategies for Majority Rule 
An offer from the arbitrator is accepted if at least two of the three players consent. The 
horizon of negotiations is finite with K shots before players are out of radio transmission. 
Therefore, counting down to shot k, random offers from vector (x1k, x2k, x3k) are generated 
using the Dirichlet distribution. Let Uk denote the value of the negotiation game when k 
shots remain until the end. Let’s consider (x1, x2, x3) the offers for player 1, player 2 and 
player 3, respectively. Let’s introduce the vector o(xi), i = 1, 2, 3, where o defines the 
probability that player i accepts the current offer xi. Set ō(x) = 1 - o(x). Let’s look for an 
equilibrium among identical strategies. 
Theorem 4.1: The optimal strategies of the players in the negotiation at period k possess 
the form 
.3,2,1,)( }{ 1 =Ι= −≥ ix ki Uxii δο  
The utility value of this negotiation game for player P1 meets the formula: 
3
1
32
1
2 62
3
1
−− +−= kkk UUU δδ                          (4.4) 
 Proof: The player P1 utility payoff at period k is given by the formula: 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = sup
𝜇𝜇1
2� 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1 � 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2{(𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1},𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, …1−𝑥𝑥1
0
1
0
    (4.5) 
From (4.5), we have  𝐴𝐴 =  𝜇𝜇1𝜇𝜇2𝜇𝜇3 + ?̅?𝜇1𝜇𝜇2𝜇𝜇3 + 𝜇𝜇1?̅?𝜇2𝜇𝜇3 + ?̅?𝜇3𝜇𝜇2𝜇𝜇1 
And   𝐵𝐵 =  ?̅?𝜇1?̅?𝜇2?̅?𝜇3 + 𝜇𝜇1?̅?𝜇2?̅?𝜇3 + ?̅?𝜇1𝜇𝜇2?̅?𝜇3 + ?̅?𝜇1?̅?𝜇2𝜇𝜇3 
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Where U0 = b; μ1 = μ1(x1); μ2 = μ2(x2); μ3 = μ3(1-x1-x2); 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = sup
𝜇𝜇1
2 ∫ 𝜇𝜇1(𝑥𝑥1)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘(𝑥𝑥1) + 2∫ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1 ∫ 𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘(𝑥𝑥1)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥21−𝑥𝑥101010     (4.6) 
Where 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘(𝑥𝑥1) = ∫ {(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1)(𝜇𝜇1 + 𝜇𝜇2 − 𝜇𝜇2𝜇𝜇3)}𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥21−𝑥𝑥10  
And 𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘 = (𝑥𝑥1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1)𝜇𝜇2𝜇𝜇3 + 𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 
The optimal strategy for P1 is 𝜇𝜇1(𝑥𝑥1) = 𝐼𝐼{𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘(𝑥𝑥1)≥0} 
Due to problem’s symmetry, the optimal strategy for P2 and P3 is idem μ2 = μ3. With 
Gk(0) ≤ 0 and Gk(1) ≥ 0 there exist a such that Gk(a) = 0. For and equilibrium among 
threshold strategies, Gk(x1) has a different shape on the intervals:  
Gk(x1)=(x1-δUk-1)(2 aI {x1 ≤1-2a } +       
2(1-a-x1)I{1-2a < x1 ≤ 1-a} +     (4.7) 
 0I{1-a < x1<1})      
With Gk(a) = 0 and a = δUk-1 , we can express  
Gk(x1)= (x1-δUk-1)(2 δUk-1 I {x1 ≤ 1-2a } 
+ 2(1- δUk-1 -x1)I{1-2 δUk-1  < x1 ≤ 1- δUk-1 }        (4.8) 
+ 0I{1- δUk-1  < x1<1}) 
If P2 and P3 choose the threshold strategies 𝜇𝜇2 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑥𝑥2≥𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1} and 𝜇𝜇3 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑥𝑥3≥𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1} then 
the best response for P1 must also be 𝜇𝜇1 = 𝐼𝐼{𝑥𝑥1≥𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1} and by substitution  
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 2�𝜇𝜇1(𝑥𝑥1)𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘(𝑥𝑥1)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥11
0+ 2� � {(𝑥𝑥1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1)𝜇𝜇2𝜇𝜇3 + 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1}𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥21−𝑥𝑥1
0
1
0
       (4.9) 
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= 4𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 � (𝑥𝑥1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥11−2𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1+ 4 � (𝑥𝑥1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1)(1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 − 𝑥𝑥1)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥11−𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
1−2𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1+ 2 � (𝑥𝑥1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1)(1 − 2𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 − 𝑥𝑥1)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−11−2𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
0
 
The recurrent formula brings to the result and proof that: 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1 + 13 (1 − 3𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1)(1 − 6𝐵𝐵2𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−12 ) ends of the proof ■ 
In the case of no discounting, δ = 1, and the horizon of negotiations is infinite, we have 
limk→∞ Uk = ⅓. Players should always take the offers when the arbitrator suggests. 
4.3.5 Equilibrium Analysis 
The strategy profile in period t is represented as {(xit, x-it), g-it } where (xit, x-it) is the 
splitting rule as offered by the arbitrator and g-it is the function with arguments as players 
except Pi “accept”, then we have a majority which is ruled and each player gets its share 
[13]. Otherwise, all players get nothing or “reject”. In the last period T-1, the strategy 
profile {(xiT-1, x-iT-1), g-iT-1 } is a NE if gjT-1 (|xjT-1|) = “accept” for j ≠ i and there is no 
value |xjT-1| > |zjT-1| such that gjT-1(|zjT-1|) = “accept” for j ≠ i that leads to the existence of a 
value |xjT-1| < |zjT-1|. 
Per NE, there is no incentive for Pi to unilaterally increase its demand because any 
increase request would cause a rejection by another Pj ϵ P-i which will cause the game not 
to reach the simple majority. As part of the number of players forming the simple majority 
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rule, no players would want to reject a share offered by the arbitrator, since any rejection 
of a share by the players will cause the game not to reach its simple majority quorum. 
Finite Horizon Bargaining game: The finite horizon bargaining is the applicable game 
for the MANET with arbitration for the reason that all players are dynamics, the mobility 
of the players makes the bargaining finite because players will run out of transmission 
range and furthermore cause possibly the end of the game. The finite horizon bargaining is 
easily solved by backward induction. 
Let’s consider n players, i =1, 2, 3,… the set of offers X=[ x1, x2, x3], let ui(x) the utility 
player i derives at period t. We assume ui(.)  is continuous, we normalize to 0 the payoff 
to players when there is no agreement. Let X0 denote the set of offers from the arbitrator 
that are individually rational for all players. X0 = {x ϵ X, ui(x) > 0 for all i}, X0 is non-
empty and the payoff is assumed to be discounted by a common factor δ as δt-1ui(x). The 
restriction is made to the stationary equilibrium where each player adopts the same 
acceptance rule in each period. Given any stationary acceptance rule σ-i tracked by other 
players, the largest expected payoff ?̅?𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝜎𝜎−𝑖𝑖) that player i may derive given σ-i. An optimal 
acceptance rule for player i is thus to accept the proposal x if and only if ui(x) ≥ δ?̅?𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝜎𝜎−𝑖𝑖) 
which is stationary. Denotes A = {x ϵ X, ∃N0 ⊂ {1,2,3}, |N0|= n0, ui(x) ≥ δvi ∀i ϵ N0}, 
and the equilibrium satisfies vi = P E[ui(x) | x ϵ A] + (1 − P)δvi where P = Pr(x ϵ A)  
 Proposition 4.1: Whatever is the majority requirement (n0), a stationary equilibrium 
exists. [13] 
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Proof: Define the function v → φ(v), where φi(v) corresponds to the right hand side 
(RHS) of vi and let ū = maxi,x ui(x). The function φ is continuous from [0, ū]n to itself, 
thus, it has a fixed point. 
4.3.6 Communication Overhead Analysis 
The analysis of communication overhead in MANETs is an issue because it affects the 
energy consumption of an already limited battery lifetime of the mobile node. The 
communication overhead is related to different parameters such as the network size, 
node’s mobility, node radio range, and network density [54]. The nodes requesting the 
arbitrator’s service are considered a spontaneous cluster with the arbitrator as the cluster 
head (CH) for the bargaining process. The CH knows the identities of the nodes in need 
of service based on their primary request message. The reply message from the CH is to 
inform about the availability of an arbitrator. Nodes are in 1-hop distance from the CH 
[54] [51]. The negotiation between mobile nodes and the arbitrator follows an efficient 
cluster-based exchange of messages and data. The spontaneous cluster is dismantled once 
the bargaining is completed or one of the mobile nodes is out transmission range. 
4.4 NEGOTIATION WITH N PLAYERS 
In this section, we show how to deal with the game engaging n players. The arbitrator 
evaluates the majority m = int(n/2)+1, such that the majority is reached if at least m 
players accept their offers during negotiations. The arbitrator randomly generates offers in 
the form of vector (x1k, x2k,…, xnk) at shot k. The joint density function of the Dirichlet 
distribution is described by:  
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Let Uk indicates the value of the game at shot k and K denote the number of negotiation 
cycles before the game ends. In a negotiation game with majority rule, the arbitrator needs 
to have the consent of the majority players (m players) in order to transfer the data 
collected to the AP. With n players on the line, the arbitrator aims for a complete consent 
from players. The arbitrator then counts the number of players that agree on their offers. 
The game ends when the counting is greater or equal to m. For the vector (x1k, x2k,…, xnk) 
generated at shot k, the optimality equation is defined by: 
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According to [4], the function Gkn(x) is in the form 
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By substitution into (4.10), (4.11) and also apply certain simplifications we have: 
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Theorem 4.2: Consider the resource sharing problem with n players and the agreement 
by the players of their shared resources. The optimal strategies of players at shot k are 
determined by: [4] 
.,...,1,)( }{ 1 nix ki Uxii =Ι= −≥δο  
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The utility value of this negotiation game for a player meets the recurrent formula 
defined as follows: 
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Proof: Consider the resource sharing problem with n players, the offer’s acceptance 
requires complete consent: p = n 
The joint density function to the Dirichlet distribution is as follows: f(x1,x2,…,xn)=(n-1)!, 
Denote Unk the utility value of players of the game at shot k,  
μ0 = 1-μ and μ1 = μ, also the annotation μσ where σ = {0, 1} 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛 = (𝑛𝑛 − 1)! sup
𝜇𝜇1
�� � …� 𝜗𝜗1−𝑥𝑥1−⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2
0
1−𝑥𝑥1
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Where 𝜗𝜗 represents 
𝜗𝜗 = � �𝜇𝜇1𝜎𝜎1𝜇𝜇2𝜎𝜎2 … 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 . � 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛 , 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 < 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ��
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2 …𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1(𝜎𝜎1𝜎𝜎2…𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛)  
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘
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0
 
. � {𝜇𝜇2𝜎𝜎2 …𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 .𝐹𝐹1,𝑘𝑘}𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1 …𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1(𝜎𝜎2𝜎𝜎3…𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛)  
+ � � … � (1 − 𝜇𝜇1). � {𝜎𝜎2𝜇𝜇2 …𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛 .𝐹𝐹2,𝑘𝑘}𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1 …𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1}
𝜎𝜎2…𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛
1−𝑥𝑥1−⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2
0
1−𝑥𝑥1
0
1
0
 
The optimal strategy is defined by: 
66 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛 = (𝑛𝑛 − 1)!� 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥1)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛1
𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
𝑛𝑛
                 (4.15) 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥1)= 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛−1𝑝𝑝−1(𝑥𝑥1
− 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
𝑛𝑛 ) � … � 𝐼𝐼{� {𝑥𝑥1 ≥ 𝑎𝑎}� {𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=𝑝𝑝+1
𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=2
1−𝑥𝑥1−⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2
0
1−𝑥𝑥1
0< 𝑎𝑎}}𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2 …𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1                                                                                                (4.16) 
Where the function Gnk-1 (x1) is defined as: 
𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥1) = (𝑥𝑥1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛 )� …� 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥2 …𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1                     (4.17)1−𝑥𝑥1−⋯−𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2
𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
𝑛𝑛
1−𝑥𝑥1
𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1
𝑛𝑛
 
= � (𝑥𝑥1 − 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛 )(1 − 𝑥𝑥1 − (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛 )𝑛𝑛−2(𝑛𝑛 − 2)! , 𝑥𝑥1 ≤ 1 − (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛0, 𝑥𝑥1 > 1 − (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛                                                                                        (4.18) 
By replacing the expression into (4.18), we have: 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛 = 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛 + (1 − 𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘−1𝑛𝑛 )𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  
This concludes the proof. ■ 
 
Require: # players, N≥3; Time period before out of range, T; storage, 
Q; time transferring a packet, t; Cost factor, δ; 
Initialization: ; 
1: c ← minvalue of player payload 
2: While T > 0 do 
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3:   Arbitrator makes offers to players 
4:   For each Player receiving offer do 
5:      If accept (Playeri) then increment count End If 
6:      If count reach Majority Then Data-Transfer 
7:      Else  No Data-Transfer   
8:               Q ← Q(1 – δ) ; 
9:      End If 
10:   Decrement T; 
11:   End While   
12: End  
Table 4.2: Algorithm for arbitration 
 
The complete consent of the players is the target of the arbitrator when offers are made. 
Players have the same weight when the time comes to transfer data. The randomly 
generated offers made by the arbitrator are the size of the resources to transfer to 
destination. In case, players participating in the game have the same weights, the 
distribution guarantees the same opportunities for all players. However, if a player has a 
higher weight, its parameter will be increase during the Dirichlet distribution. Moreover, 
the final solution of utility depends on the length of the negotiations horizon. The 
algorithm in table 1 shows how resources are allocated among the players.  
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4.5 SIMULATION RESULTS 
S1 D1A1
 
Figure 4.1: Snapshot of MANET, source S1, destination D1 and arbitrator A1 with 
different routes to destination 
In this section, we provide MATLAB simulations for better insight into analysis of the 
negotiations with or without arbitrators. The arbitrators use Dirichlet’s distribution to 
make offers to players. This research work has proposed a high-level, game theoretic 
modeling for decisions of data transfer in MANET based on a simple majority 
mechanism. In the simulation, we quantitatively compare our proposed mechanism with 
the Service Negotiation model for Selfish nodes in the MANETs (SNSM) [53]. 
Parameter Parameter values 
Simulation Time 500 sec 
rotocol AODV 
Number of Nodes 20, 30, 40 
Arbitrator Nodes 5, 10 
Transmission Range 20m, 35m 
Node Initial Position Randomly distributed 
Mobility Model Random Waypoint 
Simulation Area  100m x 100m 
Channel Type Wireless Channel 
69 
Node Speed interval 0.2 m/sec – 15m/sec 
Traffic Type Constant Bite Rate 
Time Step 0.1 sec 
Table 4.2: Simulation Environment 
 
The SNSM is also compared with the mechanisms of TIT-FOR-TAT (TFT) and Time-
Dependent of Bourware tactics (TBD) [45] [53]. The SNSM designs a negotiation model 
for service bidding of selfish nodes in MANET. The use of virtual currency enables selfish 
nodes to participate in the network lifetime achievement.  
The simulation setup parameters are provided in Table 4.2. We considered a MANET 
with 20 to 40 mobile nodes, including arbitrators randomly distributed initially in an area 
of 100m x 100m. Each node is free to move with a speed range of 0.2-15m/s, and also a 
20m radio range. Arbitrators have a 35m radio range. The heterogeneity of the mobile 
nodes in the network creates an asymmetric communication between a normal node and 
an arbitrator. Regular nodes can only communicate with an arbitrator if they agree on the 
offers from the arbitrator. Meanwhile, an arbitrator can directly communicate with any 
regular node provided that, a deal is made to find the shortest route to destination. 
 
Figure 4.2. MATLAB Simulation Screen of 20 Mobile Nodes (15 normal Nodes and 5 
Arbitrators) 
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Figure 4.3: (a) Complete Consent  (b) Simple Majority     
 
Figure 4.3 represents the advantage of using arbitrators for data transfer in a network 
with selfish nodes. We have a 75% connectivity failure due to mobility and selfish nodes 
ignoring communication requests. When injecting the network with 5 arbitrators, we have 
almost a 15% decrease in connectivity failure. By increasing the number of arbitrators to 
10 in a 20 node network, the connectivity failure ratio drops by 35%. It’s noticeable in the 
network that the arbitrators with wider radio ranges reduce the number of hops to the 
destination. 
The offers made by the arbitrator result in acceptance or rejection by the players. Data 
transfer only happens if a majority of players consent. The average utility is defined as 
such in [53]. In our proposed scheme, the mean is half the offers made to player i and its 
minimum acceptable payload. The arbitrator’s resources available to players are 
empirically shared between the subset of players for the duration of the negotiation. 
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Normalizing the shareable resource to “1” unit gives 1/n, the shared value allotted to each 
of the n players. Most successful negotiation sequences occur when the minimum required 
load per player is lower than 1/n. 
 
Figure 4.4: Average Utility Obtained during Negotiation Sequence for both SNSM and 
Arbitration 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the average degree of utility for the SNSM with a maximum value of 
0.1. Unsuccessful rounds of bargaining are represented by the value 1. The proposed 
solution with the arbitrators making offers to mobile nodes has a very low average utility. 
Mobile nodes also have low minimum payloads. The average utility between the offer and 
the minimum acceptable payload by a mobile node is almost equal to zero. The proposed 
solution has a better performance compared to the SNSM. 
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Figure 4.5: Negotiation Game with Three Players (c) 
 
The negotiation game implemented through simulation shows in figure 4 5 (a) that 
player’s payoff when using the complete consent for different value of the discount factor 
δ = {.95, .90, .85, 75} decreases. Around the period T = 6, it tends to stabilize and remain 
constant. For the simple majority in figure 4.5 (b), the player’s payoff decreases and 
stabilizes by the period T = 3. Of course, the majority player’s payoff is higher than the 
complete consent because, only the simple majority of players’ needs to agree and for the 
game to successfully end compared to an agreement of all the players. 
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Figure 4.6: Average minimum Payoff a player received during negotiation 
 
The figure 4.5 (c) shows the advantage of a simple majority in terms of player’s payoff 
compared to complete consent. The network is also beneficial with the fact there is an 
agreement for the arbitrator to carry the task of data transfer over. A better player’s payoff 
for the complete consent will be to reach an agreement by the third period (T = 3). The 
figure 4.6 shows an estimate of the average minimum player’s utility based on the number 
of nodes composing the spontaneous cluster. A cluster of two nodes will have almost the 
same minimum payoff for each node. 
4.6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter models the problem of dynamic resource allocation in a multi-hop MANET 
of N heterogeneous nodes (including arbitrators) as a perfect information bargaining game 
where arbitrators make offers using Dirichlet’s distribution. The proposed algorithm based 
on simple majority works to the advantage of the overall network through involvement of 
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arbitrators in data transfer. The arbitrator’s offers of 1/n to all requests enable the players 
to accept based on there being no frustrations with other nodes receiving preferential 
treatment. We have performed through simulation, which clearly showed that, if the 
arbitrators are rational, they can dynamically adapt their decisions to achieve the best 
benefit and optimize the network performance. The case of malicious arbitrators or 
malicious nodes and malicious arbitrators colluding will be the subject of future 
investigation.  
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Today, online network services have evolved as the highest-emergent medium, 
enabling various online activities to be lucrative. However, these lucrative activities also 
bring new forms of privacy threats to the community. In a reliable e-business service, 
users should be able to trust the providers of the service to protect their customers’ 
privacy. The service providers should not risk the personal and private information about 
their customers in cyberspace. There is an economic gain for a business provider when 
users trust the service provider. Despite those benefits, cyber security concern is the main 
reason some large organization may go bankrupted. Unfortunately, attackers may attempt 
to breach a provider’s database and expose customers’ private information. Therefore, in 
this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework for security and trust relationship in 
cyberspace for users, service providers and attackers. Mathematical proofs and 
evaluations support our model. Service providers may use the model to see how 
important and dissuasive against attackers is when investing in cybersecurity.  
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
In an ever-growing telecommunication industry, E-business gradually becomes of an 
importance to the social economy. While Online Social Network (OSN) has quickly 
grown into a wide network, for convenience, users see these OSNs not just as a platform 
to establish contacts, but also as a source of business, advertisement and entertainment. 
Although OSN users receive a variety of advantages and benefits from these services, the 
CHAPTER 5 
GAME THEORETIC MODELING OF SECURITY AND TRUST RELATIONSHIP IN 
CYBERSPACE 
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OSN providers are seeking financial gain. The applications developed for these OSNs 
generate enormous interest in how people use cyberspace like Internets, Facebook, 
Instagram, and Twitter. This win-win solution also comes with new threats and privacy 
concerns to the community [58]. Considering the exponential increase of requests in 
cyberspace on a daily basis, this is a critical challenge for users and providers. For 
instance, malicious websites and fake URL addresses that look like the real deal. The 
attack is led to make the user believe he is on the right website and trick him to provide 
personal information. This deception can come through web-forms in an email received 
from an acquaintance containing a link to click; but in fact the link is embedded with a 
malware to collect private information from the user and his computer interactions [39]. 
5.1.1 Motivation 
OSN providers should strive to protect their users’ privacy and information. User 
privacy and private information in the wrong hands will definitely hurt the monetary 
benefits of the provider. Risk and trust are two behavioral factors that sway decision 
making in an uncertain environment like cyberspace. While OSN providers face cyber 
attack on a daily basis, it is their responsibility to educate the users about all potential 
breaches of security and the methods to mitigate the risk [40]. 
Mass media are on the front line of creating awareness information that leads people to 
develop a bias and trust cyberspace differently. Whenever there is a security breach the 
media may induce emotional outbursts about risks and their potential consequences; for 
example, the identity theft of Target Store credit card users and the massive hack of Home 
Depot customers’ information. [58]. We proposed in this chapter a game theoretic 
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approach to establishing a relationship between trust, defined as a kind of risk assessment 
and various factors that could affect the assessments (risk). The media can tilt the balance 
of information in most trust systems that considers risk as a psychological cost. Moreover, 
breach of security on a providers’ infrastructure by attackers will have less impact if users 
are informed by the providers than a television broadcast or newspaper. Therefore, 
distrusting a providers’ capability to secure users’ privacy and private information will 
hamper any plausible positive results. It is consistent with intuition: a user who hears a 
security breach of private information on the news foresees a lack of investment in 
security infrastructure and intent to cover up compared to providers reaching out to users 
and inform them of the security breach and a promise to upgrade security infrastructure. 
5.1.2 Contribution 
This chapter centers around the proposed concept to mitigate cyber attack behavior 
with security implementation. The preponderance of successful attack launch by an 
attacker or a group of attackers may be because of the vulnerability of the security 
infrastructure due to a lack of adequate investment. System administrators defend the 
system ‘s infrastructure against intelligent misbehaving users (attackers),  while users 
tempt not to trust an online service in case of a compromised of their data privacy. The 
specific contributions in this work are summarized below: 
• We propose a mechanism design to mitigate cyber attack behavior in security 
implementation using a game-theoretic approach. 
• We formulate an original three-player game to model conflicting and rational 
confrontation between players. 
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• We analyze the different solutions obtained from the Nash equilibrium (NE) 
• We interpret the different outcomes on how they may benefits system administrator 
or decision-maker. 
The provider’s objective is to secure the users private data against an attacker whose 
objective is to breach the system and expose users’ private information. The user’s main 
concern is to safely use his private information in cyberspace. 
Some research work exist in this area which we summarize here. In [39], Kim et al. 
examined the relationship between trust and risk as determinants of trusting behavior in 
e-commerce. The risk of cyberspace manners can be classified as high, low and 
inexistent. Cyberspace behaviors include activities such as online purchase of an article 
or providing private information to an e-vendor.  
Kamhoua et al. [61] proposed a game theoretic model to help the online social network 
users determine the optimal policy in terms of data sharing using a zero-sum Markov 
game model. While the authors make the assumption that the probability transition 
function, the reward and the discount factor are common knowledge among players. 
There is a possibility that some of the information is made private or not available to the 
opponent. Huber et al. [35], presented the Friends-in-the-middle Attacks by exploiting 
social networking sites for spam. The impact of spam is simulated on the online social 
site Facebook. Raya et al. [36] proposed and analyzed a game theoretic model of the 
trust-privacy tradeoff using incentives that allow building trust and at the same time 
keeping the privacy loss at a minimum. The game model shows that individual players do 
not contribute to trust establishment unless they received an appropriate incentive. As an 
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example, the process of revoking of access rights for misbehaving nodes is not done 
unless there are incentives for voting players.  
Seigneur et al. [37] introduced an approach to achieve the tradeoff between trust and 
privacy in online transactions. The privacy is preserved with the use of pseudonyms for 
different transactions. Thus, the linkability of the transactions is prevented and a level of 
reputation is assigned to each of the pseudonyms. In order to increase the level of trust of 
an entity, a combination of several reputation levels is required and the number of 
pseudonyms to link depends on the reputation trust level. Lilien et al. [38] discuss the 
difference between privacy preservation and trust establishment for online transactions. 
Assumptions are made about users having a set of private attributes that they want to 
conceal and a set of corresponding credentials that are helpful in establishing trust for 
these users. The tradeoff problem is formulated as the choice of the minimum number of 
credentials to be revealed for satisfying trust requirements, such that the users’ privacy 
loss is minimized.   
Douss et al. [60] discussed a game-base trust establishment for mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANET). The authors introduce an evaluation model for trust value. Then, a 
computational evaluation of the methods is applied and finally, a framework is proposed 
for trust establishment. Han et al. [78] proposed a method of infiltration exploitable 
through cloud and not the traditional computing process: the side channels. It gives a rise 
to new risks as hardware to create a virtual machine (VM) is shared between users, which 
attackers can exploit. By starting and having the VM in the same server as a user data, an 
attacker can siphon private information such as web traffic and encryption keys. Given 
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the danger of cross-side channel attacks, some user may require while using the cloud 
service to be physically isolated from the resource of the cloud service provider. Zhang et 
al. [79] proposed HomeAlone which is a defensive tool that helps a user determining if 
its VM resource allocation has an exclusive use of the physical machine. The tool can 
detect the activity of an attacker’s co-resident VM by analyzing a portion of the L2 
memory cache set aside by his VMs.  
Basar et al. [80] explained the devastating cost of failure to properly secure a network 
from an attack. The authors showed how an attacker can infiltrate a network at one node, 
and from the compromised node, the attacker can breach easily and access other nodes of 
the network infrastructure. Wang et al. [81] analyzed the nodes’ decision in a cluster 
environment. The cluster environment is composed of n clusters of m nodes, which is n x 
m individual nodes. The attacker to launch an attack chooses the number of clusters to 
attack, while the defender chooses how many nodes can participate in the decision in 
each cluster. A zero-sum game is formulated during which the defender maximizes the 
expected number of clusters that decide  correctly and in the same time the attacker 
minimizes the say number. A general framework is proposed to find the Nash 
equilibrium. However, the assumption made is that the structure of the cluster is fixed, 
which give a better optimization strategy to the defender by just changing the cluster 
structure. 
In short, the previous researches on privacy are mostly focused on the current interests 
of the different players, and previous works on defense against an attacker or an intruder 
are mostly concentrated in the interests of both players. But most of the game players 
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would like to take the long-term strategy in face of interest for all three players in the 
game. In the existing literature, when using game theory frameworks, there is no three-
player game. We have a two-player game: the defender against the attacker or the 
provider strategizing on how to improve trust with the users. None of the game 
approaches involve the defender, the user and the attacker at the same time. In this 
chapter, even though, the media viewpoints create awareness that influences users to be 
more bias in trust of various OSNs differently. We are interested in the relationship 
established between trust and risk in cyberspace using game theoretic modeling.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The section 5.2 presents the 
system and the threat models. In Section 5.3, we propose the game theoretic model. 
Section 5.4 presents the numerical results. Finally, the conclusion and future works are 
drawn in Section 5.5. 
5.2 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS 
5.2.1 Objectives 
With the development and popularization of online network service (ONS), the safety 
of ONS’s users’ privacy becomes a crucial and critical issue. The service provided gains 
in popularity because it facilitates the living conditions of the people. Any proven 
amelioration of living conditions will always attract more and more customers or users. 
To better serve its customer, a service provider has to deploy and make the service 
available anywhere and at anytime it is needed. As any lucrative business, the service 
provider in order to remain in business has to secure and protect its own confidential data 
and for the incentive of doing the business, secure and protect customers confidential and 
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data privacy. Whenever there are financial and private information flowing around, there 
will always be misbehaving actors trying to take advantage of the situation. 
5.2.2 System Model 
The figure 5.1 illustrates our system model: An online service provider with lots of 
customers that use the services through their electronic devices with connections to the 
Internet. The users are known as regular customers with their electronic apparel (i.e. 
Computer, laptop, tablet, smartphone, etc.) using cyberspace (i.e. Web-apps, mobile-
apps, phone-apps) to buy goods or services. Technically, the user may run different 
number and version of applications provided by the business service without any negative 
impact on this illustrated model. The applications, even though use on different devices 
to access the online services require an operating system to function and the operating 
system is managed by a service provider. In practice, a user in order to acquire goods or 
services online has to provide personal information, but not limited to: full name, address, 
DOB, social security #, credit card #, PIN#, bank account#, etc... These information in 
the wrong hands may cause lots of damages to the owner of the information. The 
damages can range from financial ruins, bankruptcy, loss of identity, debts, and more. 
The attacker or group of attackers represented on figure 1 illustration as “Attacker” is an 
intelligent user with unorthodox behavior. The attacker's main intention is to launch an 
attack or even coordinated attacks to gain access to critical or confidential information of 
the service provider and users’ private information. Instead of the attacker launching 
attack against “easy” target like a user because of the minimal security an user can afford, 
the attacker prefers to launch attack against the service provider. In case of a successful 
83 
attack, the payoff will be colossal. Therefore, there are three major players defined in our 
system model, the users, the providers, and the attackers. The users are known as regular 
customers with their electronic apparel using cyberspace (i.e. online applications) to buy 
goods or services. The providers are businesses developed on the cyberspace that provide 
goods and services that are financially profitable. The attackers are entities with 
malicious intent. Their agenda is to attack providers’ infrastructures and collect users’ 
privacy, private information and companies’ secrets. The attackers possess the electronic 
gears to launch an attack on the provider’s infrastructure. A direct attack on one user is 
not that beneficial for the attacker. Therefore, an attack on the data repository of a 
provider may lead to a gain in multiple users’ private information. 
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Figure 5.1: Overview of Component Interactions between User/Attacker/Provider 
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 We assume a user needs his personal and private data available in order to conduct an e-
business. We also assume that there are risks involved when information is used online. 
Users are aware of the potential risks; therefore the user needs to have a level of trust and 
confidence before providing personal information. The user takes all necessary 
precaution to keep his private information hidden from the public. The service providers 
need to invest in security for two major reasons:  
1. To protect their infrastructure against daily attack perpetrates by attackers.  
2. To secure transaction information made by the users.  
For example, any interactions with the user that involve exchange of users’ private data 
over the internet should be secured using secure sockets layer (SSL). The implementation 
of credential verification will make sure that the user using the information is the user 
owning the information. We assume the attacker’s main objective is to breach the 
providers’ infrastructure security system and gets the users’ and company’s private 
information. Going after a user’s private data directly may not be beneficial to an 
attacker. Moreover, the user’s data like credit card information can be cancelled and 
rendered useless to the attacker. The attacker monitors the providers’ system for security 
vulnerabilities. For example, an operating system may have bugs exploitable to gain 
administrator credentials to the system, or strong passwords were not implemented  and 
are easily guessed or tricked. 
The goal is to make it difficult for attackers to breach the system and gain access to 
useful business and users’ private information. Providers’ data that can be breached are 
divided in two groups: futile and vital. Providers’ strategies to be safe include investing 
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in system upgrades, vulnerability correctness, architectural scalability of data, and 
network security. If a security breach occurs, this would limit the breach to futile data as 
much as possible, while making the system available and user friendly. Users have the 
tendency to either trust or are suspicious of online-sites because of the available 
information at risk.  
In our model, we do not address the leakage of business and users’ private information 
by mechanisms other than the attacker breaching the provider’s security system. For 
example, a business may sell users’ information to another company for financial profit. 
Although this constitutes a user privacy breach, it is outside the scope of our research 
work. 
5.2.3 Trust-Risk Game Model 
In spite of the risks reported about threats in cyberspace, for example, the spread of 
malicious worms on computing systems, cybercrime such as identity theft that may lead to 
financial ruin, money laundering by the drug cartel on the internet [39] [40], people still 
show a high level of dependency on cyberspace. Given that private information is traded 
for the user’s trust, privacy preserving entities (cyber system providers) have to participate 
at a satisfactory level of trust without gratuitously revealing too much private information. 
Users have the tendency to trust or distrust a cyber-site because of the risk perception on 
sharing their private information. Hence, a user perception of low trust for a cyber-site 
may be associated with his perception of a high risk and its consequences on his privacy 
and private data. Similarly, the perception of high trust can be associated with the 
perception of low risk which implies negligible consequences for privacy and private data 
86 
shared. Therefore, trust and risk are reverse mechanism concepts which mostly 
conceptually reflect how a user makes a choice to use cyberspace for business, social or 
private transactions. It becomes paramount to find and implement a mechanism of fairness 
protection between the user’s private data and the provider’s ability to secure. It is even 
questionable whether both entities would be efficient in data protection. 
The use of game theory is called to solve the above related issues. We have the Attacker-
Defender game (ADG) between the attacker and the provider and the User-Provider game 
(UPG) between the user and the provider. ADG captures the competitive interactions 
between the attacker who is trying to circumvent the provider’s system and gain access to 
users’ private data and the provider who needs to invest in securing its customers/users’ 
private data. UPG models the combination of factors that helps the user assigning a level 
of risk (high or low) on an e-business or OSN if their privacy and private information is 
shared. Moreover, if data breaches occur, how efficient is the corrective approach to 
mitigate the damages.  
We combine both games ADG: non-cooperative game between 2 players; the provider 
and the attacker, UPG: cooperative game between two players; the user and the provider 
into one game theoretic with three players: user, provider, and attacker. 
5.3 GAME-THEORETIC MODEL 
This section considers a game with three players: An attacker, a provider and a user. Our 
assumption is that the three players are rational. Therefore, they understand the system in 
place and can perform the necessary calculation to only take the actions that improve their 
expected payoff. The attacker has two defined strategies: launch an attack (A) on the 
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provider’s infrastructure or Not launch an attack (NA). Only one of the two strategies can 
be used at a time by an attacker. The attacker strategy to launch an attack on the provider’s 
infrastructure may consist of a multi-stage process involving steps such as a brute force 
attack, scanning for known vulnerabilities, SQL injection, buffer overflow, exploit attack, 
bypass firewall rules with spoof attack, Trojan horse or backdoor attack. The provider of 
the system has two choices in terms of strategies, to either Invest in security (IS) or Not to 
Invest (NIS). The provider’s strategy to invest may consist of a multi-stage process and 
actions such as system-wide monitoring, software updates, patching of vulnerabilities, 
installing intrusion detection system (ids), clustering and duplicating data servers, and/or 
IP-hopping and firewalling. Therefore, the financial component tends to influence the 
provider to not invest in security. The user has also two strategies applicable: trust the 
provider’s cyber-site (T) with their personal information henceforth, uses it to make a 
transaction or distrust (D) the provider’s system and does not use it.  
A 3-tuple represents a strategy profile for this game which indicates the action taken by 
each player. For example, the strategy profile (T, IS, A) shows that the user trusts the 
provider’s system to make a transaction, the provider invests in security for his 
infrastructure, and the attacker launches an attack to breach the provider’s system. 
Let us examine the utility structure of the game. Given the profile of action, the 
payoff/utility is the player satisfaction. We normalize the payoffs to the players following 
the strategy profile. Following are the parameters used in the game:  
• The parameter α represents the probability of an attacker getting detected or caught 
on the provider’s system, given that he has invested in security.  
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• The parameter b represents the benefit of the attacker from attacking and not 
getting detected or caught by the provider. 
• The parameter λ represents the loss to the provider if an attacker launches an attack 
on the provider’s system and the attacker is not detected or caught. 
• The parameter p represents the loss to the attacker from getting detected while 
launching an attack on the provider’s system. 
• The parameter σ represents the probability that critical data in the provider’s 
system are compromised given a successful attack. We consider that any 
successful attack on the provider’s system will give up critical data, which means σ 
> 0. Moreover, not all successful attacks can compromise the provider’s critical 
data (σ < 1). Therefore, we have 0 < σ <1.  
The correctness of our game model depends on the correct estimation of the loss λ and 
the probability α. The guidance issued [6] by the United States Securities Exchange 
commission (SEC) requiring companies to disclose all cyber incidents with detail 
description of costs and relevant information such as insurance coverage. Therefore, the 
data provided from previous cyber incidents can be used to estimate the different 
probabilities values and cost to be used with our defined game model. There is a sense of 
assurance when a provider invests in security which has its reward. 
• The parameter R represents the reward that can be calculated as a function of 
revenue generated by the users’ transactions because the users see the provider’s 
system a low risk in terms of divulging their private information. 
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• The parameter e represents the total expenses. Investing in security by the provider 
requires a total expense.  
• The parameter G represents the gain defined as what the user gains by using the 
cyberspace for any transactions. For example, user shops online from the comfort 
of your home or office compared to spending time, driving to the store, spending 
money on gas, etc.  
• The parameter d represents the cost of a user that worried about his private 
information being compromised or when the user is informed that there was a 
security breach on one of its service providers and the steps taken to monitor and 
mitigate the situation. 
Table 5.1 shows the game model in normal form. Table 5.1 is a combination of two 
tables. The left-table shows the game model when the user trust (T) the provider’s cyber 
system. The right-table shows the game model when the user distrusts (D) the provider’s 
cyber system. The payoffs of the three players are represented in each block in three lines. 
The first line in the block is the user payoff. The second line is the provider payoff, and 
the third line represents the attacker payoff. 
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The payoffs are calculated as follows: If the player chooses the strategy profile (T, IS, 
A), which means, the user trusts (play action T) the provider’s system and uses it for cyber 
transactions, while the provider invests in security (play action IS) and the attacker 
launches an attack (play action A) targeting users’ private information (cf. Left-table, 4th 
line, 3rd column). 
The provider gets a reward R for investing in security and also incurs a cost e for the 
security expenses. Amid the attacker launches an attack with a probability α (because the 
provider has invested), it will incur a loss λ(1 - α) if successful. This will result in an 
expected loss of λ(1 - α) for the provider. The attacker payoff is the benefit b of launching 
without getting caught or detected less the probability α of getting detected if the provider 
invests in security: 
User trust (T)  User distrust (D) 
 Attacker  Attacker 
A NA  A NA 
Pr
ov
id
er
 
IS 
{G – λ + αλ; 
R – e – λ (1 – α); 
b - pα} 
{G; 
R - e; 
0} 
 {G – λ + αλ - d; 
R – e – λ (1 – α); 
b - pα} 
{G - d; 
R - e; 
0} 
NIS 
{G – λ + αλ; 
R - λ; 
b} 
{G; 
R; 
0} 
 {G – λ + αλ - d; 
R - λ; 
b} 
{G - d; 
R; 
0} 
(a ) User plays action (T)  (b) User plays action (D) 
Table 5.1: Stage Game in Normal Form 
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Uatt(T, IS, A) = b - pα 
The user payoff 
Uuser(T, IS, A) = G – λ + αλ 
is the difference between the gain of the user’s trust in using the system and the expected 
loss from the system if compromised. The user’s partial loss λ(1 - α) is the result of the 
attacker breaches into the provider’s system and gains critical information which are 
users’ private data. The player’s payoffs in the other strategies profile are calculated the 
same way.  
5.3.1 Game and Equilibrium Analysis 
This section analyzes the game, derives all possible Nash equilibria from the game in 
Table 1, and understands its impact on the players. Per definition of Nash equilibrium 
profile: no player can increase his payoff by a unilateral deviation. Moreover, players are 
rational; each of them is playing his best strategic response to other two players’ best 
strategies. Thus, the Nash equilibrium can help predict the behavior of the player wanting 
to maximize their payoff in the game. 
R – e – λ(1 – α) > R – λ 
  e < λ α      (5.1) 
It means that investing in security is the best option for the provider in order to lower the 
risk of users’ private information being breached. Moreover, the attacker can only target 
the provider’s system knowing that the provider has invested in security when we have: 
b – pα > 0         (5.2) 
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The penalty is huge for the attacker to get detected while launching an attack on the 
provider’s system. The reward of launching an attack should be worth the risk of getting 
caught.  
As a matter of fact, any game in strategic form has a Nash equilibrium (NE). Let find the 
conditions applicable to the parameters for all possible pure Nash equilibria. 
Theorem 5.1: If α < α0 = e/λ, then the game in Table 1 admits a pure strategy NE profile 
(T, NIS, A). 
Proof: An examination of the eight different pure strategies in Table 1 shows that the 
only possible pure NE is when the provider does not invest in security, the user trusts the 
cyber system and the attacker launches an attack on the provider’s infrastructure. For the 
other strategy profiles, there is at least one player able to increase its payoff by a unilateral 
deviation.  
When the attacker targets the system and the provider does not invest in security, we 
have:  
Uatt(T, IS, A)-Uatt(T, NIS, A)      
     R – e – λ(1 – α) = R – λ      (5.3) 
λα – e = f(α).       
The function f(α). is a linear function with slope λα and its lower bound value is the cost 
e. Thus, f(α) is increasing.  
The initial value f(α0) = λα0 – e = 0. 
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Case 1: if e > λ α,  
then Uatt(T, NIS, A)–Uatt(T, NIS, NA) > 0.  
This condition is not the choice to fulfill to the best for the provider’s system by not 
securing its infrastructure. The provider prefers not to invest than to invest. The attacker 
prefers to attack with a positive payoff the provider’s system than not to attack. The 
strategy profile (T, NIS, A) is a pure Nash equilibrium because the players of the game 
cannot increase their payoff by a unilateral deviation.  
Case 2: if e/λ < α < b/p,  
then we have the difference in the payoff Uatt(T, IS, A) - Uatt(T, IS, NA) > 0.  
Thus, the attacker prefers to launch an attack on the provider’s system than not to attack.  
The payoff Uprov(T, IS, A) – Uprov(T, NIS, A) > 0.  
Thus, the provider prefers to invest than not to invest into the security of his system. The 
strategy profile (T, IS, A) is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game because neither the 
provider nor the attacker can increase their payoff by a unilateral deviation. 
Case 3: if e < λα and α > b/p  
There are no pure strategy profiles for a Nash equilibrium in the game. The strategy 
profile (T, IS, A) is not a NE because the attacker can increase his payoff by simply 
changing his strategy from A to NA. The strategy profile (T, NIS, A) is not a NE because 
the provider can increase his payoff by simply changing his strategy from NIS to IS. With 
this back and forth reasoning, it conveys to us that we do not have a pure strategy NE. 
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However, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is highly plausible, and it’s defined and set 
as follows: denote the variables 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1. 
Let θ = xT + (1 - x)D be the probability mixed strategy NE of the user. From the basic 
game theory principles, the user optimal strategy is to randomly choose between strategies 
T and D such that the provider’s system is at the lowest chance of security breaches.  
We must have for the user: Uuser(T) = Uuser(D) 
Let μ = yIS + (1 - y)NIS be the probability mixed strategy NE of the provider. From 
basic principles of game theory, the attacker optimal strategy is to randomly choose y such 
that the provider is indifferent when deciding between strategies IS and NIS.  
We must have for the provider: Uprov(IS) = Uprov(NIS) 
xz(R-e-λ+λα)+x(1-z)(R–e)+(1-x)z(R-e-λ+λα)+(1-x)(1-z)(R–e)=    
xz(R-λ)+x(1-z)R+(1-x)z(R-λ)+(1-x)(1-z)R 
 ⟹ z = z0 = e/(λα)          (5.4) 
We know that 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 and thus,  
Uprov(IS) < Uprov(NIS) 
 ⟹ 0 ≤ z < z0 ≤ 1                   (5.5) 
And also  
Uprov(IS) > Uprov(NIS) 
 ⟹ 0 ≤ z0 < z ≤ 1              (5.6) 
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Similarly, consider σ = zA + (1-z)NA to be the probability mixed strategy of the attacker. 
The attacker randomizes between IS and NIS in such a way that the attacker is indifferent 
when choosing strategies IS and NIS. This is translated by:  
Uatt(A) = Uatt(NA) 
⟹ xy(b-pα)+x(1-y)b+(1-x)y(b-pα)+(1-x)(1-y)b=0 
⟹b-ypα=0 
 ⟹ y = y0=b/pα            (5.7) 
We know that 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 and thus,  
Uatt(A) < Uatt(NA) 
 ⟹ 0 ≤ y < y0 ≤ 1                  (5.8) 
and  
Uatt(A) > Uatt(NA) 
 ⟹ 0 ≤ y0 < y ≤ 1                  (5.9) 
Given the condition in (3) and (5) are verified and the probabilities y and z hold. 
Therefore, the strategy profile {T, y0IS + (1-y0)NIS, z0A + (1-z0)NA} is a mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium. However, if the conditions are not met, then we can verify that there is 
no possible mixed strategy. 
In summary, it is important to the provider to invest in security. The cost or expense e 
should be worth the equivalent value of loss. In other word, the effort from the provider in 
term of securing the users private information is very important in measured to the impact 
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of losing customers because the trust level is low which means the provider’s business is 
high risk and untrustworthy. The provider invests commensurably to the worth of its 
business may have dual impacts: 1) Users are confident to use the system for business 
transactions because of the investment in security and low risk of having their private 
information rendered public. 2) The higher the security, the better is the dissuasion to 
attacker to breach the system because of the penalty up to prison incarceration if they are 
detected and caught. 
5.4 NUMERICAL RESULTS 
Our game equilibria had provided a detailed exposition of the game model and its 
properties. In this section, we derive from the game analysis our numerical results. The 
MATLAB simulations support the game-theoretic techniques analyzed in this chapter. 
The values we have used in this MATLAB simulation is just to illustrate and provide 
concrete examples. The variables used in the calculation of mixed and pure strategy 
equilibrium were R, e, p, λ, b, and α. We will assign values to some variables and they 
will remain fixed during the entire simulations while others variables increase or 
decrease. 
For the first scenario, we will set the value of all needed parameters to R = 1, e = 0.2, λ 
= 0.6, b = 0.5, p = 0.68 and α is variable. We chose these values as an illustration of a 
non-intuitive suggestion of our game model. Figure 5 2 shows that the provider’s payoff 
is constant when α< α0 = 0.33 which is case 1 of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
When the payoff of the provider is constant while the probability α is increasing, the 
rational player will be better looking to increase its payoff. However, the case 2 defines 
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as another pure strategy Nash equilibrium with α < 0.73. At α ≥ 0.73, there is a change of 
strategy from pure to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. There is an attenuation on the 
provider’s payoff, which means the frequency of the attack causes the provider to slowly 
increase its payoff. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Variation in Provider’s Payoff with Probability Alpha 
 
By setting α = 0.51 and R = 0.95, Figure 5.3 shows the strategy change for the pure 
Nash equilibrium to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The loss to the provider λ is the 
variable in this case. We also can see the three cases of strategic change, the first one 
when λ < λ0 = e/α = 0.39, the second pure strategy is the case where (0.39 ≤ λ ≤ 0.84) 
and the major shift occurs at the λ=0.84 when the provider’s payoff reaches 0.34. 
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Moreover, the shift is to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The decrease in value is 
for the provider’s payoff its way of showing that it’s not rewarded by the game when the 
loss increases.  
 
Figure 5.3: Variations in Provider’s Payoff with the Loss due to Security Breach 
 
The expense e translates as the cost to improve the security of the provider’s 
infrastructure against an attack. From the values selected, we have the provider’s payoff 
constant until it reaches e = e0 = 0.3 in expense and it follows with a decrease in payoff 
for provider because the investment in security is paying off. There is a drop in payoff for 
the provider when he invests e > 0.73; the provider’s payoff is negative. If the provider 
can invest in security up to e ≥ 0.7 the loss due to attack will be minimal with less impact 
to the users’ privacy or manageable loss of private information. The mixed strategy NE 
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indicates that the attacker may willing to target the provider’s system with a high risk of 
getting caught and low risk of getting breach.  
 
Figure 5.4: Variations in Provider’s payoff  
The game clearly admits multiple Nash equilibrium strategies and the expense e will 
provide guidance to players’ choice. 
Figure 5.5 shows that the attacker’s payoff drastically dropped when there is any 
investment made by the service provider to improve the security of its infrastructure. If 
the parameter α that represents the probability of an attacker getting detected or caught on 
the provider’s system is over 0.5 (alpha ≥ 0.5) the expected probability of the attacker of 
not getting detected or caught is under 0.1. In case the attacker relies on its probability 
gain from figure 5.5, it will be to the best interest of the service provider to invest in the 
security component by increasing the expense e, which will also increase the probability 
α and it will be good to have α ≥ 0.5. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this chapter, we optimize the trust between the users and the provider by the use of 
the game theoretic approach. The three player game in this case provides a quantitative 
approach to perform a cost analysis of the security investment. The provider does not have 
the luxury to not invest in security. Any online service network where customers provide 
their private information should show concern with protecting consumers’ data. 
This research takes into account the action of all the players. The game has multiple 
possible Nash equilibria that can be converted into pure strategy or mixed strategy under 
specific conditions. Our research finds that an increase in the frequency of attack and the 
provider able to mitigate the loss might cause the attacker to be detected and caught. Thus, 
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the limited benefit generated by the attack may force the attacker to not attack because of 
the risk and penalties. 
For future work, we plan to investigate and apply a game to come up with an optimal 
function for mapping the gain when the provider invests in security and the loss when the 
attacker succeeds in targeting the provider’s infrastructure and the users’ private data are 
compromised, this will clearly refine the payoff of each player. 
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Prevalent concerns with dynamic networks typically involve security. Especially with 
resource constraints in dynamic networks such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), 
security needs to be of particular consideration. In this chapter, we first analyze the 
solution concept involved in optimizing resource allocation and data packet forwarding. 
In a MANET, the availability of having data packets forwarded may be insubstantial due 
to the presence of selfish nodes. Nodes may not want to participate in the network to 
preserve their own resources. We propose a packet-forwarding problem with a 
negotiation game, where an arbitrator acts as a cluster head and initiates a bargaining 
game. Thereafter, we consider the possibility of having some group of nodes exhibit 
malicious behavior and collude to subvert the MANET. We investigate the problem by 
finding the optimal Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies of the negotiation game. Then, we 
simulate the effect of the coalition of malicious nodes in a mobile environment. 
Simulation results support our model. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been significant growth in research involving terminal mobility in dynamic 
networks.  One category of such networks is a MANET.  In a MANET, autonomous 
mobile devices are deployed across the area of a network.  The device mobility, the 
absence of infrastructure, and wireless communication render the topology unstable.  
CHAPTER 6 
A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITH 
COLLUDING NODES IN MANETS  
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Because of these characteristics, as well as resource limitations in energy such as battery 
life, mobile devices may face issues with connectivity and link reliability.  This limited 
nature of resources in a MANET encourages some nodes to behave selfishly by 
attempting to preserve their own resources.  As a result, the only way for data packets to 
move throughout the network is if these mobile devices rely on one another to transfer 
data.  The reliability of the network depends on this level of cooperation.  In order for 
data packets to be delivered from one node to another, nodes must have an incentive to be 
participative [49]. 
Existing literature provides methods on incentive mechanisms as ways to alleviate the 
effect of having selfish nodes in a MANET.  We consider the novel implementation of an 
arbitrator in a MANET to initiate a bargaining game with players.  The arbitrator will 
offer shares of its data storage as a way to optimize resource allocation in the network.  
These shares are fractions of the arbitrator’s data storage and are randomly distributed to 
players.  Players involved in the game will be allowed to accept or reject these offers 
from the arbitrator.  A vote by simple majority will decide if data transfer will complete a 
negotiation session [31].  By the time a player is out of transmission range if the majority 
of players have not agreed on their resource allocation, the negotiation game ends.  This 
implementation into the model will help maximize network reliability and increase the 
throughput in the MANETs. Researchers have also considered the presence of malicious 
behavior in dynamic networks [10] [22].  The lack of robust security measures can be 
considered a result of a MANET’s limitation.  Although many types of attacks exist, 
many of them focus on deteriorating the resources and services of the network.  We 
consider a particular kind of malicious behavior in the model proposed in this chapter.  In 
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this model, a group of mobile devices can collude among itself to exploit the 
functionality of the arbitrator.  Constant exposure to collusion will eventually degrade 
network reliability.  This chapter investigates the bargaining game and how the proposed 
solution can be used to analyze the behavior of colluding nodes. There are researches in 
the field of mobile ad-hoc networks and some security concerns are perceivable.  To 
improve the network reliability, Buttyan and Hubaux [50] proposed virtual currency as a 
way to stimulate participation in data packet forwarding.  The authors proposed, each 
node earns certain amounts of “nuglets” that is used to transfer data.  When a node 
requests to have data packets forwarded, the “nuglet” count decrements by one, and 
when a node forwards a data packet, the “nuglet” count increments by one.  However, 
The solution concept, does not consider the scenario of not having enough currency to 
proceed with forwarding requests. 
In [24], Liou et al. considered a bargaining game as a way of handling the access 
network selection.  Possible access networks include wireless metropolitan access 
networks (WMANs), third generation/code division multiple access (3G/CDMA), and 
wireless local area networks (WLANs).  The authors introduced a bargaining game 
between the participating device and the access network, such that the resource allocation 
of the network is negotiated between the two players after a call request is made.  
Although the game attempts to optimize resource allocations of the network, it requires 
that nodes are constituents of a network where devices may be mobile but the base station 
must remain static. Marti et al. [22] introduced a technique to improve throughput in ad 
hoc networks. The proposed technique is built on top of the Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) protocol.  To alleviate routing misbehavior in particular, the technique involves 
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categorizing nodes as either watchdog nodes or pathrater nodes.  The watchdog node 
seeks to identify misbehaving nodes, while the pathrater node uses its information of 
misbehaving nodes to decide a better, more reliable route to take to proceed with data 
transfer.  However, Implementing the technique, can lead to collision problems, false 
reports in behaviors, and collusion. 
In [45], Niyato et al. addressed the problematic and dynamic issues of network access 
selection in heterogeneous networks by studying the application of evolutionary game 
theory.  Users in the network compete for shares of bandwidth availability, where the 
following competition is modeled as an evolutionary game solvable by finding its 
evolutionary equilibrium. Two featured algorithms for network selection are scrutinized.  
The influence of the users competing for shares is noted in this study. 
The mobility functionalities described in [41] are categorized as a mobile sink or 
mobile relay, which define methods either in collecting data or passing them on to the 
next mobile entity.  These mobile nodes use their short radio transmission ranges to 
accumulate data efficiently.  Furthermore, using parameters of a service-driven MANET 
as a foundation, Riordan and Grigoras [52] proposed the implementation of a data mule 
service appropriate for network needs.  This data mule is typically highly mobile and is 
deployed in the area where it can be used to transmit data packets between the requester 
and the client. Boudec and Buchegger [64] proposed an extension of the routing protocol 
as the method for detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes.  The proposed work 
essentially builds on the idea that nodes will learn from behavior by participating in 
“neighborhood watch” and sharing experiences concerning malicious behavior.  After 
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receiving warning information on some particular malicious nodes, a path manager will 
reconfigure which safe paths to take for data exchange.  The method calls for 
improvements in the data link layer and employs the Dynamic Source Routing protocol. 
In [41], Rossi et al. presented an intrusion detection system where collusion is 
considered in improving path reliability.  In the intrusion detection system, the pathrater 
algorithm categorizes nodes into several different classes.  Essentially, full participation 
in the network depends on the rating associated with class membership.  Simulated 
results show that the system has improved tolerance for collusion among malicious 
nodes.  However, The system, does not support statistical analysis based on optimal 
threshold values.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. System models and motivations 
are surveyed in the Section 6.2, game-theoretic analysis is provided in Section 6.3, 
simulation environment and results are presented in Section 6.4, and conclusion and 
future works are articulated in Section 6.5.  
6.2 MODELS AND MOTIVATIONS 
This section introduces the system model under Problem Description and Network 
Model.  Motivations behind this study are briefly provided in the final part. 
6.2.1 Problem Description 
Let the MANET have any number of nodes, N, from 1 to N, positioned throughout an 
area, such that the nodes can be rigidly placed or mounted onto some mobile object.  By 
means of a MANET, nodes share characteristics of both a router and a broadcast access 
point.  Meaning, a node can store and collect data packets, as well as connect to some 
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other routing device [5].  As nodes of a MANET are usually limited in resources such as 
battery life and computational power, it is not favorable for nodes to forward data under 
requests other than their own.  However, it is required for nodes to forward data packets 
in order to benefit the overall network.  Establishing connections among nodes is 
therefore an expected challenge by the mobile and infrastructureless nature of a MANET 
[1].  To mitigate the adverse effects of having selfish nodes in the network, our proposed 
model requires an arbitrator to serve as a cluster head and negotiate shares of its own 
data-storing resource to allocate to those in need of data packet forwarding.  This 
functionality of the arbitrator gives nodes incentive to participate in the network.  The 
main concern with the current model is that it assumes that nodes will act independently 
when bargaining with the arbitrator.  As a result, the possibility of malicious nodes 
colluding to deteriorate network reliability is considered here, which comes from the 
postulation that a group of nodes can coordinate together to bargain with the arbitrator. 
6.2.2 Network Model 
The MANET is considered as an area of locally deployed wireless devices (access 
points) based on IEEE 802.11 standards [24] [6].  The key features of the current model 
remain consistent in this model.  Mobile objects are deployed throughout the area where 
they can represent cruisers, fire trucks, planes, etc.  The access points distributed across 
the local area network will serve as data repositories for the accumulated data. 
Furthermore, the mobility of the nodes in a MANET is arbitrary, with the location of 
each node contained in three-dimensional space.  Each node covers a dynamically sized 
area of the network over some random and freely determined speed and direction.  
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Variable-sized areas of coverage represent realistic expectations in a MANET.  For 
example, suppose that devices are mounted on a helicopter and a police cruiser.  
Although both vehicles are free to move any which way, the helicopter may cover a 
broader area in comparison to the cruiser. 
The waypoint model supports the mobility of these nodes.  Waypoints are random 
vectors uniformly distributed across the specified area.  The nodes move accordingly 
over time until they reach their waypoint.  When a node reaches its waypoint, it may 
pause and reconfigure its waypoint parameters.  Furthermore, we consider interactions 
between regular nodes and any one arbitrator.  A regular node will normally request its 
need for data packets to be forwarded across the network, and the request will then be 
broadcasted to the node’s neighbors for help.  With enough requests from a group of 
regular nodes, an arbitrator will offer its service and resources, provided it has enough 
resources of its own to sustain its service [66] [62] [65].   
6.2.3 Motivations 
Current research on the topic of MANETs may only consider the event of rational and 
selfish nodes existing in the network.  In which case, the resource allocation problem is 
directly addressed.  This is easily supported since nodes in a MANET are 
characteristically constrained and limited by battery life, computational power, etc.  
However, it is for these same reasons that MANETs are also not secure.  For example, 
limited computational power can limit a mobile device by making cryptographic 
procedures impossible or simply impractical if by having these security features drains 
the battery of the device as well [49].   
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We first consider the case when a regular node requests packets to be transferred.  The 
node runs the routing algorithm to find the shortest path required to transfer data, then 
follows typical procedures of incentive or reward programs in order for other nodes to 
cooperate with the request.  Setting arbitrators as data mules [52] and having them with a 
wider transmission range allow such nodes to be beneficiaries of the arbitrator’s services.  
The arbitrator’s data-carrying capability and broader range should reduce the number of 
hops required to pass data packets from a source to a destination.  As requests to have 
data packets transferred accumulate, the arbitrator will have to consider more allocations 
of its resources.  It will implement the round robin algorithm and the handshaking 
procedure of the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) to 
relieve communication density and to address the hidden node problem. We also consider 
the opportunity a node has to collude and bring malicious intent to the network.  
Malicious nodes will try to use all the resources, of the participating nodes in a network 
such as battery life, that its reliability is eventually compromised.  As mentioned before, 
many security threats exist in a MANET due to the very nature of its design as a network.  
Such threats include, but are not limited to blackhole attacks, denial-of-service attacks, 
routing loop attacks, and Sybil attacks [28]. 
In this framework, malicious nodes may cooperate to compromise the functionality of 
the arbitrator.  Since the model requires that the arbitrator initiate a bargaining game with 
players making requests to have packets forwarded to the destination, and the success of 
the game depends on the majority vote of all players, a particular group of players may 
collude to upset the vote.  Subverting the voting mechanism across all games in the 
MANET causes the deterioration of network reliability.  In addition to this, prolonging 
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any given bargaining game by evasion of a successful vote wastes the power and battery 
life of the arbitrator, thus exhausting its purpose. 
6.3 GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS 
The following summarizes the method for optimizing resource allocations between an 
arbitrator and a regular node [49]. 
6.3.1 Negotiation Model  
Let there be a set of nodes in the network such that N = {1,2,…,n} represents the set of 
players eligible for negotiation.  Note that the arbitrator is independent of this defined set 
of players.  The unique feature of the arbitrator lies in its data storage capability and its 
wider transmission range.  The arbitrator’s data storage capability also characterizes it as 
a data mule [52].  When nodes make requests to have data packets forwarded, the 
arbitrator will receive the requests and initiate a bargaining session.  The length of time of 
the bargaining session will depend on the positions of the nodes involved and how long it 
will take for the first player to move out of range of the arbitrator.  As soon as any player 
leaves the arbitrator’s transmission range, negotiation will cease to continue. 
After requests are made, the full length of time before the first player exits the 
arbitrator’s transmission range is calculated, and the number of cycles, or shots, of 
negotiations are estimated.  In each cycle, the arbitrator will offer shares of its resources 
to each player, so that the size of each share are randomly determined.  This arbitrary 
manner of allocation eliminates the possibility of any kind of bias or partiality in 
forwarding data.   
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After the arbitrator offers resource shares in the first shot, each player in the game will 
have the opportunity to accept or reject the offer.  If the simple majority, defined as being 
more than half of players in the current shot accepts their offered shares of resources, data 
transfer will occur.  Otherwise, if the majority rejects the offer, the session will proceed 
to the next shot or cycle.  At the very last shot, equal shares of the resource will be 
offered, and if the majority decides to reject the offers at the final shot, data transfer will 
not occur during the session. 
6.3.2 Random Distribution and Optimal Strategies 
The random assignment of share sizes is represented by the Dirichlet distribution, 
which is essentially the set of probability distributions specified by some vector k.  The 
sum of all outcomes of the distribution is equal to 1, such that the sum is proportional to 
the entire size of the arbitrator’s data storage.   
The distribution takes observations of n possible outcomes with positive real 
parameters xi, i=1,…,n, and the probability density function (pmf) of the Dirichlet 
distribution (Dir) for variable vector xi = (x1, x2,…, xn) with the parameter vector (k1, …, 
kn) is given as 
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is dependent on parameters (k1, …, kn), where they serve for modifying the weights of the 
distribution.  The density is asymmetric if k is not a constant vector. The operation Γ 
represents the Gamma function.  
 Consider the negotiation game between the simple case of three players, and in a given 
negotiation cycle, random offers from vector (x1k, x2k, x3k) are generated using the 
Dirichlet distribution.  Suppose Uk denotes the value of the negotiation game with k shots 
remaining and o(xi), i = 1, 2, 3, represent the probability that player i accepts the offer xi.  
Finally, let ō(x) = 1 - o(x).  We analyze the following. 
Theorem 1: The optimal strategies of players at shot k possess the form 
.3,2,1,)( }{ 1 =Ι= −≥ ix ki Uxii δο         (6.3) 
The utility value of the game for player i satisfies the formula 
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 Proof: The proof of this theorem derives the proof theorem 5.2 in chapter 5 
When δ = 1, which represents the case of no discounting, and the horizon of 
negotiations is infinite, we come to the conclusion that limk→∞ Uk = ⅓, and players should 
accept the resource shares that the arbitrator offers. 
6.3.3 Threat Model 
Malicious nodes colluding to subvert the network are typically characterized by any 
instance of intentionally wasting the resources and reliability of the network.  In this 
model with arbitration, colluding nodes are considered as those that request significantly 
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larger shares of resource allocation.  By consistently requesting significantly larger 
shares, the colluding nodes are seeking to exploit the arbitrator’s data carrying capability.  
As a result, and as previously mentioned, since data transfers are administered by simple 
majority votes, colluding nodes may also manipulate any given negotiation session by 
consistently rejecting their offers over the specified number of cycles.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1:  A simplification of colluding nodes interacting with both an arbitrator and a 
regular node in a bargaining session 
 
In Figure 1, let A represent the arbitrator holding a bargaining session with nodes B, C, 
and D.  Node B is a regular node that is selfish and behaves rationally.  Nodes C and D 
are colluding to deteriorate the services of the network.  Let node B bear a minimum 
payload of ¼ the storage of the arbitrator, A, and let nodes B and C bear minimum 
payloads of ½ each.  If for example the calculated number of cycles in a bargaining 
session is 3, then for each cycle, the majority vote to accept offers will never pass 
throughout the session, even at the final shot when equal allocations are offered.  
6.3.4 System Modifications and Nash Equilibria 
The negotiation model investigated in this chapter will maintain its key components, 
such as requests to forward data, responses to such requests, randomly generated offers, 
D 
B 
A 
C 
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and majority-vote decisions.  However, in this proposed investigation, instead of having 
equal allocations offered at the final shot of the negotiation session, we will consider 
offering equal allocations at the initial shot of the session.   
We consider this conjecture as we acknowledge the simulation results in [49], which 
shows that successful negotiation sessions typically follow from having minimum 
payloads per player below 1/n, where n is the set of all players involved in a given 
session.  Also note that any involved strategy profile in which an arbitrator randomly 
generates offers is a Nash equilibrium.  Resource allocations are optimized and rational 
players are anticipated to accept the offer.   
6.4 SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
6.4.1 Design Description 
Although a MANET realistically exists in the third dimension, the proposed system 
model will be analyzed in two-dimension.  Furthermore, the total area of coverage is 
simulated in a 100m x 100m region and there are sub-areas defined for arbitrators.  A 
selected arbitrator has an assigned sub-area of coverage.  A single arbitrator is randomly 
situated in a sub-area and continues its movement within the perimeter of the sub-area 
throughout simulation time.  The arbitrator also serves as the cluster head of mobile 
nodes contained in the same sub-area, when the node requests arbitrator’s service. 
The model also includes a predetermined amount of nodes colluding to subvert the 
network, with the minimum number of colluding nodes being 2.  Colluding nodes are 
placed at one hop distance away from each other.  Regular nodes are then distributed 
randomly to all sub-areas.  For purposes of illustration and analyzing the effects of 
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collusion, the exemplary design will have 4 arbitrators, 3 colluding members, and 7 
regular nodes deployed across the area.  Arbitrators will primarily have a transmission 
range of 71m, while regular nodes will primarily have the transmission range of 40m. 
 
 
Figure 6.2:  A screenshot of 10 mobile nodes, comprised of two colluding nodes and one 
arbitrator and one regular node in each subarea 
Figure 6.2 illustrates a simplest scenario of the network model.  Note that the Random 
Waypoint model dictates the mobility of each node [66].  The endpoint of any single 
node’s path is uniformly distributed across the area, and the node travels on the path by 
some random velocity.  Reaching an endpoint, the node may pause before continuing on 
to another waypoint.  Table 6.1 summarizes the critical features of the simulated model. 
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Parameter Parameter Values 
Simulation Time 500 sec 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Total Number of Nodes 15, 20, 30 
Number of Arbitrators 4 
Initial Node Position Randomly Distributed 
Mobility Model Random Waypoint 
Simulation Area 100m x 100m 
Channel Type Wireless 
Node Speed Interval 0.2m/s – 2.6m/s 
Traffic Type Constant Bitrate 
Time Step 0.1 sec 
Table 6.1: Simulation Details 
The resource sharing functionality of the arbitrator is randomly assigned via a random 
generator distribution.  An arbitrator will carry a unit of data storage that can be allocated 
to each node requesting to have a data-packet forwarded.  A node, for example, may 
request at least 1/3 of the storage, and this share is also the node’s minimum payload.  In 
117 
this model design, the arbitrator’s data storage is determined to contain 10,000 units (i.e. 
10,000 bytes), and any negotiated share will be a portion of that total value.  
When nodes request to have their data forwarded, the arbitrator initiates a bargaining 
session.  Note that requests from various source nodes to forward data packets will be 
made to the same destination node.  In order for a node situated in one subarea to forward 
data packets to another node situated in a different subarea, it is expected that requests 
will be made through two arbitrators.  With this in mind, the assumption is made that if 
an arbitrator requests to have data packets forwarded to another arbitrator, the first 
arbitrator will not participate in the bargaining session prescribed by the second 
arbitrator. 
6.4.2 Simulation Results 
In order to analyze the effect of the bargaining game on collusion, a selection of 
values must from table 6.1 are assigned to the parameters. 
We first investigate various ranges of minimum payloads.  Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 
provide the percentages of successful negotiation sessions over simulation time.  
Following Figure 6.3, regular, non-colluding nodes are randomly set to have minimum 
payloads between 1667-3334 bytes, while colluding nodes will have minimum payloads 
between 4000-5000 bytes.  These values are fractions of the total assigned storage space 
of 10000 bytes.  Since colluding nodes are requesting significantly larger shares of 
storage, we expect nearly all voting procedures to upset occurring bargaining games.  
Figure 6.3 exhibits relatively consistent percentages of successful votes over simulation 
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time.  By the end of the 500s, negotiation games are about 76% successful without 
collusion, while negotiation games are 37.1% successful with collusion. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates a similar conclusion with the exception of colluding nodes 
having payloads within 3500-4000 bytes.  In the first 100s of negotiations, we exhibit 
sporadic instances of successful votes, as well as network performance reaching its peak 
with collusion in the network, showing that negotiation games may still be notably 
successful even with the presence of colluding nodes. 
 
Figure 6.3:  Percentage of successful negotiation sessions with minimum payload 
between 1667-3334 bytes 
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Figure 6.4:  Percentage of successful negotiation sessions with minimum payload 
between 3500-4000 bytes 
 
We then investigate the impact of having various ranges of velocities the nodes will 
have to adopt and how they relate to percentages of successful votes.  Test cases of speed 
are the following: 0.2-1.0 m/s, 2.0-3.2 m/s, 5.0-6.2 m/s, 8.1-10.2 m/s, 12.1-13.2 m/s, and 
14.1-15.2 m/s.  Although values are sporadic and inconsistent depending on the range of 
speeds, negotiation games are generally more successful when either regular nodes and 
colluding nodes have relatively lower mobility (low speed).  Evaluating the plots in 
figure 5, we notice that when the minimum payloads of colluding nodes are within 4000-
5000 units, the percentage of successful games more consistently deteriorates as speed 
ranges increase.  This confirms the expectation that network reliability is compromised 
with higher minimum payloads and increased of speeds.  Aside from this observation, we 
also note that different speeds have drastically affected the performance and outcomes of 
negotiation sessions. Moreover, nodes may want to reach a bargaining success, but the 
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high mobility of each node may cause the communication to break because the 
transmission is out of range. 
 
  
 
Figure 6.5: Successful negotiation over speed variations 
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Figure 6.6. Successful negotiation over discount factors 
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In Figure 6.6, the relationship between successful negotiation sessions and various 
discount factors is investigated.  Test cases of the respective delta values are the 
following: 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.40, and 0.50.  Discount factors affect 
the size of resource allocations made in a successful negotiation session.  Because big 
discounts take away a fraction of the resources over a horizon of negotiation cycles, 
network reliability and success rate of negotiations should deteriorate. Figure 6.6 also 
illustrates the case when colluding nodes have minimum payloads within 3500-4000 
units.  The study shows that further discounting on top of collusion present in the network 
significantly worsens network performance.  Results also show that when delta is set at 
0.05, the lowest delta value applied and tested, the network still performs 
uncharacteristically and relatively well even with collusion.  The network performance is 
better when the network contains colluding nodes than when the network does not 
contain colluding nodes.  For that matter, the network can tolerate having colluded nodes, 
but it is obvious that successful negotiation decreases rapidly. 
6.5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter models the problem of colluding mobile nodes in a heterogeneous mobile 
ad-hoc network of N nodes using bargaining game theoretic concept as an incentive to 
share resources on-the-fly and where the nodes negotiate with an arbitrator on the sharing 
rule of consent. We investigate the perfect equilibrium strategies of this bargaining game, 
by observing how each player maximized his throughput against the colluded nodes. 
Simulated results show that the bargaining game and its effect of optimizing resource 
allocations can be utilized to reveal the presence of malicious nodes colluding to subvert 
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the network.  Since such colluding nodes will tend to request larger shares of the 
arbitrator’s resource and data carrying capability, they will consequently reject offers 
involved in playing optimal Nash equilibrium strategies.  Simulated results also show that 
the loss of network reliability is a direct result of the malicious behavior of colluding 
nodes.  Furthermore, through simulation, we investigate the impact of discount factor (δ) 
on mobility, fairness and patient during a bargaining session, and we can argue that δ→1 
is a negligible value in our problem. Broadcasting the identity of colluding nodes by the 
arbitrator and their constant rejection of any offers may expose their presence in the 
network and dismantle the collusion. Therefore, improving security and the quality of the 
network. 
6.6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to acknowledge the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the 
Department of Defense (DoD) for their support. 
 
  
123 
 
An effective defense-in-depth in cyber security applies multiple layers of defense 
throughout a system. The goal is to defend a system against cyber-attack using several 
independent methods. Therefore, a cyber-attack that is able to penetrate one layer of 
defense may be unsuccessful in other layers. Common layers of cyber defense include: 
attack avoidance, prevention, detection, survivability and recovery. It follows that in 
security-conscious organizations, the cyber security investment portfolio is divided into 
different layers of defense. For instance, a two-way division is agility and recovery. 
Cyber agility pursues attack avoidance techniques such that cyber-attacks are rendered as 
ineffective; whereas, cyber recovery seeks to fight-through successful attacks. We show 
that even when the primary focus is on the agility of a system, recovery should be an 
essential point during implementation because the frequency of attacks will degrade the 
system and a quick and fast recovery is necessary. However, there is not yet an optimal 
mechanism to allocate limited cyber security resources into the different layers. We 
propose an approach using the Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework for resource 
allocation between the two end layers: agility and recovery. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The goal of cyber agility is to reduce attacks by making it harder for a determined 
adversary to succeed. This is achieved by preventing adversaries from planning their 
CHAPTER 7 
CYBER SECURITY RESOURCE ALLOCATION: A MARKOV DECISION 
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attacks over time by relying on the static nature of the networks, and launching their 
attacks at the times and places of their choosing. Cyber agility employs proactive and 
adaptive defense techniques that include randomization, diversity and obfuscation, to 
increase the levels of complexity and uncertainty in a system and disrupt adversary attack 
planning and execution. 
However, if a system administrator fully invests his cyber security resources to develop 
the most robust and agile systems against cyber-attack, there is no guarantee that the 
system will be able to avoid all attacks.  In fact, it is not always possible for a system 
administrator to anticipate all component failures or intelligent attacks perpetrated against 
its modules. Attempts to predict and protect against every conceivable failure and attack 
become cumbersome and costly. Additionally, novel, well-orchestrated, malicious attacks 
can cause damages that are far beyond the abilities of most system developers to 
anticipate.  
Regardless of how well a system is designed and secured or how well they can 
circumvent vulnerabilities and attacks, it will eventually show some unseen 
vulnerabilities, which are exploitable by attackers. Therefore, a mission-critical system 
implemented and placed in cyberspace should have the resources to recover from a 
degraded state and still carry out at least the mission essential functions (MEFs). 
Cyber resilience comprises the ability to withstand, minimize, survive, and recover from 
the negative effects of adversity, whether man-made or natural, under all circumstances of 
use. Resilient systems must not only provide the continuation of Mission Essential 
Functions in the face of disruption by a sophisticated adversary or a non-malicious fault, 
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but also fight through successful attacks to regain or even exceed their initial operational 
capability. Cyber resilience invests in recovery solutions that increase the probability of 
assuring MEFs during and after a successful cyber-attack. 
Resource allocation in a network system between avoidance and recovery is most 
pressing for mission-critical systems. One of the challenges faced by any system 
administrator is to provide equal and adequate systems security preparedness for both 
threat avoidance and recovery from threats. This work proposes a mechanism to optimally 
allocate limited cyber security resources into different layers of cyber defense. The main 
contribution of this research work is to find the optimal allocations of cyber security 
resources during the development and deployment of mission critical system using the 
Markov Decision Process (MDP). 
In the literature, there are some studies related to optimal resource allocations. The use 
of the MDP to address network security challenges has increased. The reason is that the 
MDP modeling supports a broad understanding of attacks and interactions in cyberspace.  
Arshad et al. [83] presented a semi-Markov decision based fair buffer allocation policy 
for sensor nodes and vehicular network. The proposed model gives nodes a fair chance to 
transmit its data. There is a tradeoff between energy efficiency and fairness at the relay 
node. Also, there is an increase in the number of nodes competing for buffer also results in 
an increased fair buffer allocation, but the authors did not mention or discuss the 
proportion of resources needed. 
Game theory is proposed in [73] as a modeling tool and computing for the probabilities 
of the expected behavior of the attackers in a quantitative stochastic model of security. 
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The stochastic model presented by the author analyzes a security breach as a series of 
intentional state changes. Assumptions are made for the possible rewards of a player in the 
game, allowing the calculation of the Mean Time to First Security Breach (MTFSB) for 
the system. The benefit of using the game theoretic approach is twofold: first, provide a 
more accurate model of the attackers’ behavior, which can be used to assign more realistic 
transition probabilities in the models, and second, help the defender of the system to find 
optimal defense strategies and facilitate the calculation of the expected loss associated 
with different strategies. 
In [25], the problem of sharing a resource with a time-varying capacityis presented. The 
objective of minimizing the mean-delay was investigated. The resource allocation is 
formulated as a MDP. Even though, the problem is not solvable analytically in its 
generality, an approximation of the solution is obtained. The authors in [63] proposed an 
On-line Social Network (OSN) service, an approach for helping OSN users determine 
their optimum levels of information sharing based on the Markov decision process while 
taking into consideration the payoffs (potential Reward or Cost). In [63], a decision 
algorithm was proposed for vertical handoff in heterogeneous wireless networks. The 
algorithm is based on an MDP formulation with objectives to maximize the expected 
reward of a connection. A stationary deterministic policy is obtained when the connection 
termination time is geometrically distributed. 
The authors in [69] addressed some issues to initiate path optimization for a two-phase 
handoff protocol. The use of link cost function is to reflect the network resources utilized 
by a connection. The optimal policy performance has been compared with four heuristics. 
127 
The proposed model captured the tradeoff between network resources used and the 
handoff processing and signaling load incurred in the network. There is a drawback in the 
formulation when it comes to traffic distribution between voice and multimedia 
applications. 
Ayesta et al. [68] investigated the problem of sharing resources of a single server with 
time-varying capacity. The main objective of the investigation is to minimize the mean 
delay. Nevertheless, the problem does not have an analytical solution. The motivation in 
this case is to seek an approximate solution. Two examples are provided for illustration: 
the extension of multi-armed bandits to develop a heuristic solution of index type and the 
Gittins index rule known to be optimal under the assumption of constant capacity. 
Chunlei et al. in [75] proposed a network of threat evolution model based on network 
threat evolutionary behaviors, network threat propagations and also investigated the 
influence of network threats over network survivability. By abstracting network 
survivability as a dynamic game process among attacker, defender and normal users, the 
proposed network survivability analysis is experimented in a typical network environment. 
7.1.1 Background 
Computer network systems are always targets of cyber attackers. Network systems 
deployed online should be capable of sustaining the adversity of cyber-attacks coupled 
with component deterioration by integrating agility and recovery component.  
Agility: In cybersecurity, agility is a system that has the property to remain operational 
and deliver desired and acceptable results by auto-circumventing or bypassing some 
vulnerability or issue that surged. For example, the implementation by the system 
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administrator of an IP-Hopping, (a moving target defense system), will use available 
network data and hopping algorithms to allow a constant IP addresses to randomly change 
on both source and destination IP addresses [84]. The use of "hopping" IP addresses will 
severely diminish an attacker's ability to breach a target within a network because of the 
increased uncertainty of identifying the IP address of a port. Each time the attacker scans 
the network, he gets a different IP address. Therefore, it is difficult to locate an access 
point [70]. 
Recovery: The recovery component of a system is the ability for a system that has 
suffered from an attack to regain its initial operating capability as soon as possible [62]. 
The implementation of recovery components and procedures in a system facilitates the 
switch back to a running state in a timely manner [72]. Survivability is the aptitude for a 
system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or 
accidents. As example, the database system of a financial institution may suffer 
unrecoverable loss from cyber-attacks. With the implementation of a disaster recovery 
mechanism, there is less data lost and quick turnaround. The database (data and logs) can 
be fragmented and installed on multiple hard drives with backups equipped in each hard 
drive. The backup is done in two steps; there can be a daily full backup and an hourly 
differential-backup. On a system’s breach from attack, one of the production node’s 
servers and database are down. When the server node is brought back on, the data 
recovery procedure is fast by doing a data rebuild from the backups. The database system 
is prepared for restoration, so that it may be ready to move on the production environment. 
Resource allocation is one of the important challenges in cyber security, especially when 
the systems have some Service Level Agreements (SLAs). In the cyber world, the main 
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functionalities of the system need to be active and running. However, mission-critical 
systems are usually constrained during design and implementation to have agility 
properties integrated. Specifically, the administrator mostly allocates the investment on the 
agility design and implementation. Therefore, it may not be to the system lifetime’s best 
interest to have investment focus only on agility. However, refusal to allocate the 
investment’s portion on recovery will severely hinder the mission-critical system’s 
lifetime and impair the system’s own performance. Hence, it is necessary to highly 
consider investment on recovery for any system deployed in the cyber world and where 
different interactions from different players change the states of the system. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the model 
formulation. In section 7.2, we describe the problem. We formulate the problem as a 
Markov chain in section 7.3. The Markov decision process is analyzed in section 7.4. 
Numerical results are in section 7.5, and the conclusion of the chapter sums up the main 
contributions, as well as future work. 
7.2 MODEL FORMULATION 
We consider that a system can be in one of the two states: state 1, when it’s up and 
running and state 0, which is off, degraded or non-functional. Actions based on malicious 
or normal behavior can cause the system to switch from state 1 to state 0 with a certain 
probability. The system in state 1 integrates defense layers, such as agility, avoidance and 
prevention to stay in state 1. A successful attack or a component failure can change the 
state of the system from state 1 to state 0. The system in state 0 needs a good recovery 
mechanism to come back to state 1, otherwise it stays and remains in state 0. 
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The two-state system is represented as a Markov chain, as illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Two-state Markov chain 
 
Figure 7.1 shows a state diagram with transition probabilities, as defined: 
P00 = 1 – p: is the probability that the system stays in state 0. 
P01 = p: is the probability that the system switches from state 0 to state 1. 
P11 = q: the probability that the system remains in state 1. 
P10 = 1 - q: the probability that the system switches from state 1 to state 0  
We have a state transition matrix defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑃 = �𝑃𝑃00 𝑃𝑃01𝑃𝑃10 𝑃𝑃11� = �1 − 𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑞𝑞�                                                         (7.1) 
We can observe that an increased investment in cyber agility will increase the 
probability q, whereas an increased investment in cyber recovery will increase the 
probability p. 
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7.2.1 Operational Scenario with a Two-state Markov Chain 
We have a state transition matrix defined in equation (7.1) [63]. In order to explain our 
approach, we assume that an attacker tries to compromise the system by changing it to a 
degraded state (state 0) [83]. Meanwhile, the defense team (system administrator) has two 
objectives: 
1. Make a successful attack difficult to reach its objective (increase q) and the system 
to remain in state 1 i.e., cyber agility. 
2. Provide a solution to recover from potential failure (state 0) and quickly switch the 
system to state 1 which is the functional state, i.e., cyber recovery. 
We consider that a defender, who allocates security resources between agility and 
recovery, maximizes the long-term fraction of time during which the system is in state 1. 
Using the transition probability q (respectively p), the steady-state probabilities indicate 
the long-term fraction of time during which the system is in state 1 (respectively, switches 
from state 0 to state 1). Given that the system is in state 1 at time 0, there is a need to 
know the probability that the system remains UP (state 1) at the time when n is very large. 
The eigenvalues of matrix P are λ1 = 1 and λ2 = q - p. Since p and q are probability 
values, |λ2| ≤ 1. P can be expressed in a diagonal form. 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆−1𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆
= �1 −𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞1 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞� �λ1 00 λ2� �
1 − 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞
−1 1 �                                              (7.2) 
where D is a diagonal matrix, S is the matrix of eigenvectors and S-1 is its inverted. 
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The value si, the ith row S, is the left eigenvector of matrix of transition P corresponding 
to λi meaning 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 a verified 2-step transition matrix is 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 = �𝑃𝑃00(𝑛𝑛) 𝑃𝑃01(𝑛𝑛)
𝑃𝑃10(𝑛𝑛) 𝑃𝑃11(𝑛𝑛)� = 𝑆𝑆−1𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆
= �1 −𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞1 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞� �𝜆𝜆1
𝑛𝑛 00 𝜆𝜆2𝑛𝑛� � 1 − 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞−1 1 �        (7.3) 
While extracting the common factor, we have 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 = 𝜆𝜆1𝑛𝑛1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 �1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑝𝑝� + 𝜆𝜆2𝑛𝑛1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 � 𝑝𝑝 −𝑝𝑝−1 + 𝑞𝑞 1 − 𝑞𝑞�                                  (7.4) 
with λ1 = 1; λ2 = q - p. 
Let us examine the state probability vector p(n) as n becomes very large. 
The vector 𝜋𝜋 = [ 𝜋𝜋0  𝜋𝜋1]′ =  lim𝑛𝑛→∞𝑝𝑝(𝑛𝑛) 
The initial state is state 1, the state probability at time n  
lim
𝑛𝑛→∞
𝜋𝜋1 =  𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑛𝑛  −𝑝𝑝0𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝1(1 − 𝑞𝑞)1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞 =  𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞                              (7.5) 
With λ2 = q – p < 1. 
This chain converges to the stationary distribution regardless of where it begins. 
The vector π = [π0 π1] is called the equilibrium distribution of the chain. 
7.2.2 Tradeoff: Agility vs Recovery 
We assume that P10 > 0 or 0<q<1. The system administrator cannot guarantee at 100% 
that the system will not change from state 1 to state 0. The limiting state probability is a 
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function with two variables p and q. Since both variables are probabilities, we need to 
understand the behavior of both variables along their axes. The partial derivative of π1 
(7.6) according to p-axis shows an increase with p: 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
= 1(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) − 𝑝𝑝(1)(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2 =  1 − 𝑞𝑞(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2 > 0                                   (7.6) 
The partial derivative of π1 according to variable q shows the increase on the q-axis. We 
need to find out which of the two variable p or q will make π1 increase faster. 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
= −𝑝𝑝(−1)(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2 =  𝑝𝑝(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2 > 0                                     (7.7) 
And 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
−
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋1
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
=  1 − 𝑞𝑞 − 𝑝𝑝(1 + 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)2                                                    (7.8) 
The differential of equations (7.7) and both probabilities p, q produces equation (7.8) 
which shows that the variable that increase faster depend on the sign of 1 - q - p. If the 
goal of the system administrator is to maximize the long-term fraction of time during 
which the system is UP (in state 1), then security investments need to be made in order to 
increase the variable p or q that makes 𝜋𝜋1increase faster. Equation (7.8) shows that: 
�
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞 < 1 − 𝑝𝑝 ⟹
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞 ≥ 1 − 𝑝𝑝 ⟹
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝑞𝑞                                     (7.9) 
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7.2.3 Security Functions 
Let us consider that q = 0 (respectively p = 0) if no investment is made in agility 
(respectively in recovery). We also consider that q < 1 (respectively p < 1) in case a huge 
investment is made in agility (respectively in recovery). We consider two security 
functions: the agility function and the recovery function. The agility function (respectively 
recovery function) take as input the amount of dollar x invested in agility (respectively 
recovery) and return as output the probability q (p respectively). We make two reasonable 
assumptions: 1) every dollar spent on agility (respectively recovery) increases probability 
q (respectively p) and 2) As the total amount spent on agility (respectively recovery) 
increases, the marginal rate of increase in probability q (respectively p) decreases [83] 
[84]. With these considerations, the probabilities q and p can be represented by: 𝑞𝑞 = 1 −
𝐼𝐼−𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 and 𝑝𝑝 = 1 −   𝐼𝐼−𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥. The parameters α and β represent scaling factors for the 
function p and q, respectively. 
7.2.4 Resource Allocation Scheme and Illustration 
Equation (7.9) shows that the optimum investment in agility or recovery is governed 
by the relative value of q and (1 – p). Figure 7.2 shows the probability q and (1 - p) as a 
function of investment. For this illustration, we have chosen β = 0.75 and three different 
values for α, α = 0.5, 0.75, 1.5. the probability q is an increasing function of the 
investment. The probability p also increases with the investment. However, the function 
(1 - p) decreases with the investment. Each function (1 - p) crosses the function q in a 
single point of coordinate (x*, q*). We can see from Figure 7.2 and Equation (7.9) that:  
1) If x < x* → q < 1 - p, then all investment must be in recovery 
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2) If x ≥ x* → q ≥ 1 - p, then x* must be invested in agility and the remainder of (x – 
x*) invested in recovery. 
For instance, with α = 0.5 and β = 0.75, the graph of the probability q and (1 - p) 
intersects at x* = 1.12, which means, in a mission-critical system, if the available 
investment is less than 1.12, it will be best to invest in recovery. In cases where resources 
to be allocated are greater than 1.12 then the difference is to be allocated to agility. When 
α = 1.5 and β = 0.75, then x* = 0.66. In fact, x* decreases with α while it increases with 
β. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Probability q and (1-p) as a function of Investment. 
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probability 1-p = exp(-0.75*x)
probability q = 1-exp(-0.75*x)
probability 1-p = exp(-0.5*x)
probability 1-p = exp(-1.5*x)
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7.3 THE MDP MODEL FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Resource allocation is important in cyber security, especially when the need of SLAs 
will help assist any system to remain functional in cyberspace. The previous sections did 
allow us to use the security investment functions in the presence of a two-state Markov 
chain to modify the values of probabilities p and q. Moreover, with a transition 
probability attaches to every state transition, there is an intervention or interaction to 
trigger the change of states. The system administrator main objective is to keep the 
system in active state which means there is a reward when the system is up and a cost 
attached due to attack when the system is down. 
According to the above, we are in the presence of a two-state system. The system 
changes state because of an attack perpetrated, the attack may be man-made or natural. A 
critical system implemented to run with most of the agility’s component in a cyber 
environment should explore the possibility of making a decision when the system in a 
degraded state is given. Decision-making is only related to the system’s current state; it is 
irrelevant to the previous actions and state. The MDP model can be described as follows: 
7.3.1 State Space 
The state space S is a finite set of states, S = {S0, S1} as in Figure 7.1. |S| denotes the 
total number of states in the system. 
7.3.2 Action Space 
A finite and non-empty set of available actions A(Si) ={ak}k=1,…,|A(Si)| associated to each 
state si ϵ S. Actions associated to a state either move the system to a different state or 
remain on the same state (loop). For example, A0 = {a00, a01} are the actions available in 
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state S0; action a00 makes the system remains on state S0, and action a01 takes the system 
from state S0 to state S1. 
7.3.3 Transition Probability 
Given the time t, an action a ϵ A(s) selected in state S can transfer the system into a new 
state S’ following a transition probability Pa(s, s’). The transition matrix probability is 
defined as in equation (7.1). 
7.3.4 Reward 
Given the decision-making epoch t, the selection of an action a ϵ A(s) in state S can 
generate a real-valued one-step reward function. Ra(s, s’) is the immediate reward 
incurred by the system as it is in state s, the action a is chosen and s’ is the next time 
state. 
7.3.5 Discount Factor 
The discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] describes the value of the future payoff as compared to 
the current payoff. Through the MDP-based approach, the main goal of a decision maker 
is to find an optimal policy, π*(s). The optimal policy prescribes the best possible action 
at any time t that the decision maker is in state s. The optimal policy π*(s) maximizes the 
δ-discounted average reward: 
(1 − 𝐵𝐵)�𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1)∞
𝑡𝑡=0
                                           (7.10) 
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7.3.6 Optimal Algorithm 
In this section, we introduce the optimality equations and implementation through the 
value iteration method to find the solutions. The solutions of the equation correspond to 
the optimal value functions, which also provide the basis for determining optimal 
policies. Under the policy π, the state-value function is used to evaluate the set of 
possible policies which, if executed will solve the problem presented in this chapter. The 
state-value function 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋of a state s is the expected return in reward point when starting in 
s and policy π is applied. The bellman equation is: 
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼) =  � 𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼,𝑎𝑎) �𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼′)[𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎(𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼′) + 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼′)]
𝑠𝑠′∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎∈𝐴𝐴(𝑠𝑠)                    (7.11) 
The optimal value function is defined as follows: 
𝑉𝑉∗(𝐼𝐼) =  max
𝜋𝜋
𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅
𝜋𝜋(𝐼𝐼),∀𝐼𝐼 ∈ 𝑆𝑆                                          (7.12) 
The value iteration method [31] is used to find the optimum policy. The value iteration 
algorithm is presented in Table 7.2. The algorithm converges to the optimal state-value 
function V*, thus, to the optimal deterministic policy. The optimal action for each state is 
derived from the iteration algorithm. The transition matrix and the reward value 
determine the action. The value iteration algorithm is as defined in table 7.2. 
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1.    V0(s) = 0  
2.            For each state s 
3. For each action a 
4.      Compute Qk(s,a) = R(s,a) + ∑j δ P(s,a)V(s’)  
5. Until ∀s, |Vi+1(s) – Vi(s)| < ε 
6. Compute and store π*(s) = arg maxa Qk(s,a)  
7. Compute and store Vi(s)= Q(s, π*(s)) 
8. Return < π*(s), V(s) > 
  
Table 7.2: Value Iteration Algorithm 
 
7.4 SIMULATION RESULTS 
7.4.1 Model Illustration 
In real life situations, probability q derives from the amount of resource allocated in 
terms of manpower and investments [76] to keep a mission-critical system in state S1. 
The probability p is derived from the resources allocated to the system after a breach 
occurred from attack to switch the system back to state S1. In a broad sense, if probability 
p = 0, meaning there is no resource allocated for recovery in case of an attack, then the 
long term confrontation between attacker and defender will end with the system in state 
S0 and no way to switch to state S1. With the probability p > 0, there is a recovery 
module or process implemented. The proportion of resources allocated to system’s 
recovery depends on how long the system will remain offline and how costly is the loss 
due to the system being offline and not operational.  
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The measurement parameters such as, the mean time to recovery (MTTR), the mean 
time to failure (MTTF) are known for: calculating the average time that a system will 
take to recover from failure (MTTR) and the MTTF is the length of time expected for the 
system to remain operational before any failure occurred [67]. These metrics and more 
sustain the necessity to have the correct amount of resources allocated to recovery. 
An illustrative example is to assign one unit of reward per time period for any action 
taken on the system, R01 = +1; R11 = +1; R00 = -1; R10= -1.  Here, reward R01 gains one 
unit which means, the system recovers from a failure attack. R11 gains one unit for the 
system to remain active after an attack was launched. R00 costs one unit for the system to 
remain off after an attempt to recover, and also it will cost one unit in R10 for the system to 
fail. Let’s consider a unit is gained when the system remains in S1 after an attack is 
perpetrated or switches from S0 to S1 after a recovery action. A unit is lost when an attack 
succeeded or a recovery action failed. Each time a mission-critical system is down, the 
next action or optimal action may be to bring the system back up in a running state in case 
the costs are lower than the loss to leave the system in a degraded state. When the system 
is in state S1, there are implemented resources to circumvent and avoid failure or switch to 
state 0 or down. 
7.4.2 Interpretation 
This section provides a more detailed analysis of our MDP model illustration. The 
MATLAB simulations are to support the analyzed techniques presented. Notice that this 
work has proposed a high level MDP modeling of decision of resources allocation for a 
system in cyberspace. In fact, the result of any specific experiment will depend on the 
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value attributed to the eight parameters p, q, R00, R01, R11, R10, δ and ε, where ε 
represents the error margin and it’s a smaller positive number.  
 
Figure 7.3: Resources variation between p and R10 
 
The specific values we have used in MATLAB simulations are just to illustrate a few 
specific scenarios. Generally, performance results will depend on the specific 
implementation that will also depend on particularities of the network. We examine the 
change in system reliability and effective behavior over time based on our dynamic 
analysis of a two-state MDP system [85]. 
Figure 7.3 shows changes in reward/cost when the system switches from state S0 to S1 
with probability p. Probability q = {0.70 for red frontier, 0.85 for blue frontier} is fixed, 
the cost of having the system “ON” increases with the probability of p. We can see that 
by investing in the recovery module, the probability 1-p will be lower and the system will 
not remain in the fail or degraded state for too long. With the investment already made in 
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agility to keep the system “ON”, loss R10 will be reduced to a minimum. Hence, the 
optimal action will be to recover the system each time it fails or switches into state S0. 
The MTTR decreases when resources are allocated to recovery process. 
The graph also reveals that, an increase of investment on agility when is already q = 0.7 
does not seems efficient. Therefore, a 15% increase in investment on agility for q = 0.85 
does not reduce the loss in to the system to fail. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Behavior of Probabilities p and q 
 
In case q=0.85, the optimal policy dictates for the system to be above the frontier and 
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Figure 7.5: Frontier of Optimal Actions Between p and R01 
 
Figure 7.4 shows the variations between probabilities p and q when the remaining 
parameters are unchanged. The frontier of the change between optimal actions 00 and 01 
in state S0 is almost at the same point p=0.5 (respectively p=0.95) and R10=-2 
(respectively R10=-3) with the remaining reward/cost set at R00=-1, R01=+1, R11=+1. 
For R10 = -2, the red line is the frontier. Below the red line (p < 0.5), the optimum 
policy is to invest in agility because of the small probability of recovery. Above the red 
line, (p > 0.5), there is a big probability of recovery changing the optimum policy which 
become to invest in recovery. Surprisingly, changing the probability q has little effect on 
the optimum policy as demonstrated by the almost horizontal line. However, changing 
R10 has a big impact. The frontier changes from p = 0.5 to p = 0.95 when the value of 
R10 changes from -2 to -3. 
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Figure 7.5 captures the frontier variations between the probability p and the reward R01. 
Below the frontier, both the probability to recover p and the reward to recover R01 are 
low and thus the optimum policy is to invest in agility. Above the frontier, both the 
probability to recover p and the reward to recover R01 are high and thus the optimum 
policy is to invest in recovery. 
Figure 7.6 shows the reward R11 and the cost R10 of our system in state S1. The minimal 
cost R10=-2.74 is obtained with probability q set to 0.9. The cost of failure R10 is too high 
below the frontier and thus the optimal policy is to invest in agility to avoid any costly 
failure. Above the frontier the optimal policy is to invest in recovery. We can see that the 
optimal policy is very sensitive to the variation of R11. 
 
Figure 7.6: Frontier Actions Between Reward R10 and R11 
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7.5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We investigate in this chapter, the issue of resource allocation in cybersecurity in terms 
of proportion sharing between agility and recovery, while approaching it by using the 
Markov decision process. First, the chapter explores the resource allocation proportion 
between agility and recovery using the Markov chain and presents the findings through 
limiting states probability, such that requirements from security investment should be 
available for the recovery component and then agility component. Second, the chapter 
extends the results from a Markov chain to a Markov decision process. The optimal 
allocation solutions should consider the gains from investing in the recovery component. 
The switch from a degraded state 0 to active state 1 after a period of time for any system 
means that the system has a recovery model implemented. Using simulations and the 
metrics MTTR and MTTF, this work also shows a repartition of resources that affects a 
mission-critical system’s performance in cybersecurity. 
In the future, we will consider the case of breaking down agility and recovery into 
multiple states with non-symmetrical interactions between states. We will also investigate 
the use of game theoretic models for resource optimization. 
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In this dissertation, we have explored the problem of incentivizing cooperation in 
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In a MANET as we have mentioned, there is no 
infrastructure to support information exchange like dedicated routers or access points. 
Rather, nodes have to play the crucial role of relays to help transfer data-packets across 
the network. With this responsibility, autonomous nodes with selfish behavior may arise 
to preserve nodes' energy. Cooperation among entities of such networks is important and 
indispensable to keep them operational in the face of selfish behavior. Adding to the fact 
that the autonomous node is also moving, the mobility of a device can deter or make it 
difficult for a selfish node to participate in overall network objectives.  
This chapter reflects the contributions, discusses the limitations and proposes the future 
direction of our research. 
8.1 DISCUSSIONS  
8.1.1 Data Delivery in Mobile Environment with Incentives 
We designed an incentive dynamic data delivery for a mobile environment, where mobile 
a node can move randomly and still participate in data-packet forwarding. We defined the 
bargaining model, which took into consideration the mobility factor and parameters like 
speed, direction and available resources of a node. Based on the routing protocol for node 
discovery in the mobile network, we presented the mechanism for selecting the most 
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appropriate candidate as an intermediary node. Also, the splitting rule is followed by each 
negotiator during the bargaining sequence. We defined the proper evaluation metrics to 
evaluate the nodes participating in the overall performance of the MANET compared to 
other methods. The effectiveness was presented with OMNET++ as our simulation 
environment, where node mobility is captured as close as possible to reality. The 
simulation results are presented. 
Limitations in the design and implementation are the overhead messages and extra power 
consumption for a longer bargaining time. Because of the message exchange during 
negotiation and the density of the network, when two nodes are in bargaining mode, their 
speed should be limited. A stopping procedure for the bargaining process has to be 
implemented in order to shorten the energy depletion.  
8.1.2 Arbitration in Mobile Environment to Allocate Resources 
In a mobile heterogenous environment where nodes are not homogenous, we designed an 
arbitration solution for heterogeneous MANETs in the presence of selfish nodes. We 
integrated into our solution an incentive mechanism to stimulate and enforce non-
participative nodes to be part of the overall network objectives. We have simulated the 
arbitration solution and shown the effectiveness of applying arbitrators in a completely 
mobile environment to ease and secure the data transfer. By deploying arbitrators with 
better radio transmission range, number of hops are reduced, which also reduced the 
amount of energy consumption for a packet to travel from source to destination. By 
reducing the number of hops for a packet to travel from a source node to its destination 
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node, it also increases the security of the network because we have less packets traveling 
on airwaves. 
So far, we have only considered selfish nodes acting alone. The detection of malicious 
nodes or  a coalition of malicious nodes during negotiation will improve the performance 
of the arbitrators in the network. Another improvement is to relax the responsibility of the 
arbitrator in detecting misbehaving nodes and have all nodes neighbors look after each 
other. 
8.1.3 Network Security Game: Modeling Security and Trust Relationship in MANETs 
We applied the User-Defender-Attacker game theoretic model to design the interactions 
between users, defenders, and attackers of the system in cyberspace. We formulated the 
characteristics of each interactive entity, including selfishness and non-cooperativeness. 
We also evaluated the level of security of the network and the trustworthiness of the 
network against attacks. The equilibrium strategies of the three-player game are derived. 
The simulation results are presented. 
Users trust in terms of loss when the attacker breaches the system and compromises 
users’ private data. The exact quantification of the user’s loss has not been analyzed. For 
example, when a provider system is breached because of less investment in security and 
the users are informed through mass media, the trust between the provider and the users 
should be reevaluated and the provider penalized.  
8.2 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The first part of this research mainly involves enforcing and stimulating cooperation to 
forward packets in a completely mobile environment. Regardless of the above-mentioned 
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improvements, there are other potential directions to enhance the current work, and 
develop a more comprehensive security and cooperation in MANETs using the game 
theory frameworks. A comprehensive model for an autonomous network can then be 
developed. Clearly, cross layer optimization techniques will improve the security and the 
cooperation using the framework of the game  
 
8.2.1 Stochastic Pricing and Resource Allocation Games 
The dynamic programming techniques used in Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the problem 
for a single decision maker acting in a mobile environment. In the asymmetric bargaining 
model introduced in Chapter 4, players’ bargaining powers depend on their bids, which 
can be determined using the admission price for an optimal pricing policy or an auction. 
Like the authors in resource allocation [25], we have assumed that network users do not 
anticipate their effect on the resource allocated. However, when the users recognize that 
they are not merely accepting the offers, the problem becomes a game in which the 
setting of willingness-to-pay, demand and bids becomes strategic for the network users. 
Users make self-serving decisions and economists are well aware that these selfish 
behaviors can lead to inefficiency. Johari et al. [7] showed that the price of anarchy in 
networks with elastic supply amounts to up to 25% in efficiency loss. The measurement 
is obtained by computing the ratio of the NE utility function to the socially optimal utility 
function and showing that it is ¾ at worst [7]. Stochastic games are natural extensions of 
Markov decision processes to include multiple decision makers.  
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There are some similarities between the node degree of distribution on the real and 
simulated MANET, while links are much more unstable and asymmetric in real life than 
in a simulated MANETs environment. To alleviate this discrepancy, the link status can be 
modeled in a MANET using a state Markov chain model. However, the lack of available 
data generated from real MANET experiments could not statistically confirm these 
claims. Moreover, with some analytical works, we think that this future work can produce 
promising models to better simulate link status in MANETs. 
 
8.2.2 Non-cooperative Implementation of the Cooperative Bargaining Solutions in Self-
organizing and Self-healing Networks  
In Chapter 4, we have derived a class of bargaining solutions using the bargaining 
concepts from cooperative game theory. The payoffs, indicated by the amount of 
resources allocated to the players, are sustained by a binding agreement guaranteed by 
each node in the network and the arbitrator. However, the enforcement of such payoffs 
falls outside of the domain of cooperative game theory. In MANETs, the decision-
making process has to be decentralized, as in a non-cooperative game. A MANET is a 
collection of nodes that forms a network without fixed-infrastructure. As opposed to 
networks which use routers to support network functions, such as packet routing and 
forwarding, these functions are provided by the nodes (or hosts) themselves. Such a 
network can operate in a standalone fashion or may be connected to the Internet. The 
interconnections among nodes often change continually and arbitrarily. These networks 
were initially designed for military operations and play an increasingly important role in 
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many environments, such as ad hoc networking for collaborative and distributed disaster 
recovery, search-and-rescue and crowd control. More recently, they have been envisaged 
as able to provide Internet connectivity for nodes that are not in transmission range of a 
wireless access point. The IEEE 802.11 wireless protocol incorporates an ad hoc 
networking system when no access points are present.  
In wireless mobile networks (WMNs), all routers are capable of organizing and auto-
reconfiguring themselves wirelessly, which means that no cabling is needed to connect 
them. These nodes form a rich radio mesh connectivity among themselves that is difficult 
to provide in wired networks. The principle is similar to the wired Internet; data will hop 
from one node to another until it reaches its given destination. While wireless node 
connectivity significantly reduces the upfront deployment and subsequent maintenance 
costs, the rich mesh connectivity helps to deliver high levels of reliability and robustness. 
Mesh networks are self-healing and extremely reliable because each node is connected to 
several others and if one drops out, due to hardware failure or man-made attacks, its 
neighbors simply find another route. Because of these attractive features, WMN is being 
considered for a wide variety of applications, such as backhaul connectivity for cellular 
radio access networks, combat systems and citywide surveillance systems. It can 
effectively extend a network by sharing access to a higher cost network infrastructure. 
Due to the complexity of the mobility and traffic models as well as the infrastructureless, 
dynamic topology of these networks, non-cooperative game theory is the primary tool for 
studying players, which are independent decision makers whose actions potentially result 
in efficiency loss. A vast number of works on the application of non-cooperative game 
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theory in MANETs are surveyed in [42]. Another approach is to study the 
implementation of the Pareto-optimal bargaining solutions in a non-cooperative manner. 
8.2.3 Route Calculation Based on Routing protocol and Coalition Information 
The way the non-cooperation model is currently integrated with the routing protocol 
(AODV) in chapter 3 helps fight selfish behavior through the bargaining agreement: Do 
not drop packets sent from or destined to members after agreement. However, this can be 
more effective if AODV proactively uses the nodes that are inclined to accept offers 
available to build its routing table. For example, AODV could be modified to give 
priority in choosing multi point relays (MPRs) to alliance companions such that resulting 
routes involve more nodes with less bargaining power, hence achieving more reliable 
routes. This could greatly enhance the packet delivery ratio of the network under the 
integrated system. We highly believe that this could be a promising future of the current 
work. 
8.3 SUMMARY 
In this dissertation, we have explored the problem of stimulating cooperation in mobile 
ad hoc networks (MANETs) by investigating nodes cooperation in improving the 
network throughput using the bargaining game theoretic model. We investigated the data 
forwarding task between nodes in a highly dynamic network using an arbitrator for 
resource allocation. Also, the investigation led us to consider the possibility of having 
colluded nodes in our mobile ad-hoc network interfering with the arbitrator negotiation 
process. In order to prevent complacent offers to players, the arbitrator uses a random 
generator to assign offer without memory of previous offers. Finally, we investigated the 
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interactions between users, providers and attackers in cyberspace using a three-player 
game theoretic approach to strengthen the security by providing to decision-makers the 
optimized investment in defending users’ privacy and private data against security 
breaches. 
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